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POST-PANDEMIC PRIVACY LAW
TIFFANY

C.

LI*

ABSTRACT

COVD-19, the globalpandemic that began in 2019, alteredhow we live our
lives in just about every way imaginable. Some of those changes were obviousfor example, those who werefortunate enough to be able to workfrom home began
working online-while other changes were more subtle. The latter category
included unprecedented levels of data collection by governments and
organizations purporting to collect information that would help stop the
pandemic's spread. Given the deadly nature of COVID-19, few would question
any public health efforts, no matter their impact on privacy. However, the lack of
attention to privacy issues during the pandemic can and will have long-ranging
effects that will lead to greaterlosses ofprivacy in thefuture, post-pandemic world.
This Article analyzes privacy issues in this pandemic and offers a novel
framework for crafting legislation during and after this pandemic to protect
privacy. The Article takes a unique socio-legal approach in contextualizing
privacy-relatedissues arisingfrom this time of public health crisis, examining
the impact of the coronavirus itself as well as contemporaneous social issues in
America that have shaped the way we must think aboutprivacy movingforward
(primarilyfocusing on political unrest related to the 2020 election and growing
tensions involving racism and discrimination). Ultimately, the Article proposes
a framework that post-pandemic privacy law should follow and provides
tangible legal and policy solutions, includinga federalprivacy law, updates to
existing legislation to reflect specific privacy considerations, and focus on
privacy as an integralpart offoreign policy. Finally, the Article evaluates select
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privacy-related legislation that the U.S. Congress has proposed to date in light
of the Article's proposedframework and recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the state of affairs across the
world, altering the course of human history and affecting every sector
of life and law, including privacy law and policy. In the midst of a raging
global pandemic that is killing millions of people worldwide, infecting
many times more that number, and causing devastating economic and social
consequences to all, you might be hard-pressed to find anyone' willing to
argue that the pandemic's effects on privacy law-even if significant-are the
most important topic to discuss right now. Nonetheless, privacy and civil

1. But cf. Tiffany C. Li, Privacy in Pandemic: Law, Technology, and Public Health in
the COVD-19 Crisis, 52 Loy. U. CHIC. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6),
https://ssm.com/abstract3690004.
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liberties advocates have raised the alarm, and their concerns are worth
hearing-even if, as I shall discuss later in this Article, we may not be
able to address many or any of these concerns until after the pandemic
is over.2 After all, at no point in recent history have we dealt with a truly
global health crisis like this:' one that has pushed us to use technology
and data to the limits of our current ability and imagination.'
The contagious and deadly nature of this coronavirus has forced
governments around the world to adopt social distancing and contact
tracing (including digital, automated contact tracing) as key response
measures.' This and other factors have generated a larger societal shift
to remote education, remote work, and remote socialization.' Across
the world, people shifted to living almost their entire lives online, even
experiencing important occasions such as graduations to weddings to

2. See infra Section III.A (proposing several considerations that ought to
undergird post-pandemic privacy legislation).

3. While past pandemics, including the flu epidemic of 1918, spread globally, they
could not match the speed of COVID-19's spread that has resulted from globalization and
modern advancements in travel. See Liz Mineo, The Lesson Is to Never Forget, HARv. GAZETTE
(May 19, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/05/harvard-expertcompares-1918-flu-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/J924-8E3E] (discussing, in part, how air
travel has increased the spread of COVID-19).
4. See, e.g., Lisa Baertlein, Santa Takes a Back Seat to COVID Vaccine, UPS, FedEx
Officials Say, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2020, 12:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-usa-distribution/santa-takes-a-back-seat-to-covid-vaccine-ups-fedexofficials-say-idUSKBN28K2P2
(discussing package delivery companies' use of
technology to check vaccines' temperature and light exposure, among other
information, during transportation).
5. See, e.g., Annual Symposium Panel Discussion Materials, Contract Tracing and
Other Innovative Technological Responses, AM.

U. L.

REv.

1-3

(Feb.

4,

2021),

http://www.aulawreview.org/aulaw_review/wp-content/uploads/2021 /02/ContactTracing-and-Other-Innovative-Technological-Responses-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SVZ-YBHP] [hereinafter Contract Tracing and Other Innovative
Technological Responses] (noting how South Korea, a nation lauded for its COVID-19
response, utilized credit card transaction data to assist its contact tracing efforts).
6. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, The Workforce Is About to ChangeDramatically,ATL. (Aug.
6, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/just-small-shift-remotework-could-change-everything/614980 [https://perma.cc/Q9KM-VG5] (predicting that
the increase in telework resulting from the pandemic would allow people to move away
from major cities where they might have previously worked, as they no longer needed
to commute to work); Jason Abbruzzese et al., The Coronavirus PandemicDrove Life
Online. It May Never Return, NBC NEWS (Mar.
28, 2020, 6:18 AM),
https://www.nbcnews. com/tech/internet/coronavirus-pandemic-drove-life-online-itmay-never-return-n1169956
[https://perma.cc/C9YJ-H83M]
(highlighting
the
increased reliance on technology during the pandemic and positing that some
innovations, such as remote teaching, will continue post pandemic).
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funerals online, often through the means of remote communications
platforms.7
Both public and private responses to the COVID-19 crisis have relied
on data and technology, with serious and potentially long-lasting
consequences for privacy. Contact tracing programs have required an
immense amount of data for efficacy-including sensitive health data
from a large percentage of the population.' Medical uses of technology
and data that already existed, like telemedicine and telehealth,
artificial intelligence (AI)-backed medical triage programs, and
healthcare robots, are now being used at a much greater scale.9
Schools, workplaces, and public spaces have shut down and re-opened
with various levels of pandemic-related measures, often necessitating
the collection and use of more personal data.10
The choices we make regarding data, technology, and privacy will
have lasting repercussions for individual rights in our future." One can
7. See, e.g., Kristen Schott, A Philly Singer Pays Tribute to the Virtual Weddings of the
Coronavirus, PHILA. MAG. (Aug. 10, 2020, 9:11 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/

philadelphia-wedding/2020/08/10/virtual-weddings-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/5RLS-X247] (weddings); Ryan Prior, Funerals Go Virtual in the
Pandemic. Here's How to PlanOne with Meaning and Honor the Dead, CNN (Apr. 16, 2020,

9:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/16/health/virtual-funerals-coronaviruswellness/index.html [https://perma.cc/DM3V-3MB7] (funerals); Wylie Wong, The
GraduatingClass of 2020 Gets Its Commencement-Online, EDTEcH MAG. (May 22, 2020),
https://edtechmagazine.com/higher/article/2020/05/graduating-class-2020-gets-itscommencement-online [https://perma.cc/P3YH-PZSX] (graduations).
8.

See, e.g., Contract Tracing and Other Innovative TechnologicalResponses, supra note

5, at 7 (referencing privacy scholars' concerns that contact tracing requires vast
amounts of data to be an effective tool).
9. See Annual Symposium Panel Discussion Materials, Evolution of HealthcarePrivacy,
AM. U. L. REv. 4-5 (Feb. 5, 2021), http://www.aulawreview.org/aulaw_review/wpcontent/uploads/2021 /02/Evolution-of-Healthcare-Privacy-1 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2WK-3X4C] [hereinafterEvolution ofHealthcarePrivacy] (stating that
while agency rules implementing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) still apply during the pandemic, the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Civil Rights has offered guidance allowing covered entities to employ
remote telehealth and internet-based appointment applications to reach patients); see
also ADAM BOHR & KAVEH MEMARZADEH, The Rise of Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare
Applications, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE 43 (2020) (predicting the rise
of healthcare robots, assisted by Al, as a method of replacing various professionals in
the healthcare sector).
10.

See, e.g., Contract Tracing and Other Innovative TechnologicalResponses, supra note

5, at 8-11 (providing examples of countries requiring individuals to scan QR codes
before entering buildings, employing thermal imaging cameras to check for fevers,
and relying on facial recognition technology to track citizens' movements).
11. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 nn.22-25 (discussing the "surveillance creep" phenomenon
inherent to governments' expansion of surveillance technologies following major
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begin to grasp the broader privacy dimensions of the COVID-19
pandemic only by holistically analyzing them. There is no single,
unified conception of what comprises "privacy in a pandemic," and no
one solution, legal or otherwise, that can "fix" the privacy problems
emerging from this time of global health crisis. However, by studying
the impact of the global health crisis on privacy and technology, we
can better understand the changing norms of privacy and technology
in our society, and we can begin to craft new laws that will protect
privacy during this pandemic and beyond.
In a prior article, I mapped the landscape of privacy issues that have
arisen during this pandemic, as related to public health and
technology.12 In this Article, I build upon my analysis, and on the work
of many scholars13 during this pandemic and before, to attempt to
provide not a broad theoretical analysis of every possible privacy law
issue, but rather a specific, actionable framework for creating better
legal and regulatory solutions to protect privacy during this pandemic
and in the future.
First, I examine the myriad effects the pandemic has wrought on
society, as well as the broader societal context in which it has occurred.

events, including reticence to retract expanded surveillance long after periods of
heightened alert).
12. Li, supra note 1, at 6.
13. See, e.g., Alan Butler & Enid Zhou, Disease and Data in Society: How the Pandemic
Expanded Data Collection and Surveillance Systems, 70 AM. U. L. REv. 1577 (2021)
(documenting the expansion of surveillance technologies in response to the pandemic
and emphasizing the need for the United States to establish a federal data protection
agency to protect consumer privacy); Leslie Francis, Health InformationBeyond Pandemic
Emergencies: Privacy for Social Justice, 70 AM. U. L. REv. 1629 (2021) (exploring
approaches to privacy and confidentiality of health-related information and arguing
that the notice-and-choice model for protecting individuals' privacy is inadequate);
Seema Mohapatra, Passports of Privilege, 70 AM. U. L. REv. 1729 (2021) (explaining the
concept of "vaccine passports" and arguing that the passports would further
exacerbate the societal inequalities that COVID-19 has highlighted); Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, DigitalDisease Surveillance, 70 AM. U. L. REv. 1511 (2021) (discussing the
legal standards we should use to evaluate digital disease surveillance programs that will
undoubtedly play a role in future infectious outbreaks); Anne L. Washington & Lauren
Rhue, Tracing the Invisible: Information Fiduciariesand the Pandemic, 70 AM. U. L. REv.
1765 (2021) (suggesting that information fiduciaries independent of the technology
companies involved in collecting pandemic-related data are essential for protecting
privacy and instilling confidence in pandemic responses); Laura Bradford et al.,
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps: A Stress Test for Privacy, the GDPR, and Data Protection
Regimes, 7 J.L. BIOSCIENCES (2020) (analyzing the feasibility of exposure notification
systems); Natalie Ram & David Gray, Mass Surveillance in the Age of COVID-19, 7 J.L.
BIOSCIENCES (2020) (assessing the utility of epidemiological surveillance programs).
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Then, I explain the salient shifts in social norms regarding privacy that
have arisen due to the pandemic, as well as outline some of the new
uses of technology and public health strategies that the pandemic has
introduced or expanded. Next, I propose a new paradigm for
legislating privacy during and after a pandemic that consists of three
essential recommendations. First, post-pandemic privacy law14 must seek
to cover the entire data ecosystem, recognizing the interconnected
nature of data and information, particularly given the rise of Al and
machine learning technologies. Second, post-pandemic privacy law
must address systemic inequalities and the ways in which privacy harms
and risks disproportionately affect marginalized populations. Third,
post-pandemic privacy law must be sustainable. Temporary, stop-gap
solutions are effective neither for protecting privacy during the
pandemic nor for protecting privacy after it. Finally, I analyze
proposed coronavirus legislation and highlight gaps in these proposals
and existing privacy laws, showing where the law does not properly
protect privacy rights in public health crises.
There is no perfect solution, legislative or otherwise, for protecting
privacy in a time of public health crisis. However, by following my
proposed legislative paradigm, policymakers can create practicable,
equitable, and long-lasting protections for privacy.
I. THE EFFECTS AND CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Creating and interpreting effective laws requires understanding the
social and political factors underlying the legal issues at hand. In
considering privacy in the pandemic and attempting to form a
conception of post-pandemic privacy law, it is necessary to take a highlevel view of the non-legal factors (and even the non-privacy factors)
that may influence how to protect privacy at this time and in this space.
The Sections that follow describe the severe health and other
consequences of COVID-19 as well as other events occurring
simultaneously that shape how we must view pandemic-era privacy law.

14. This Article uses "post-pandemic privacy law" to refer broadly to the legal
framework that we need to ensure proper protection of privacy both during and
following a pandemic. This terminology does not foreclose or advocate against
considering new laws and changes to existing laws before the pandemic is over. We
must continue to explore legal solutions to pandemic-related privacy concerns now
and develop the law to account for our needs both during the pandemic and after it.
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The Pandemic'sImpact

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated myriad effects that have
permeated every inch of the social fabric for our lives. As of April 2021,
over 570,000 Americans had died from the virus, and over two-and-ahalf million had died worldwide.15 Countless more have suffered from
the virus, many with long-term effects." Still more have suffered from
watching their loved ones succumb to the virus. The pandemic has also
caused other tragedies, including a mental health crisis17 and several

15. Joe Murphy & Jiachuan Wu, Map: Track Coronavirus Deaths Around the World,
NBC NEws (Apr. 24, 2021, 10:23 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/worldmap-coronavirus-deaths-country-covid-19-n1170211 [https://perma.cc/FAZ2-ZSZM].
While there are many theories behind why this virus became as deadly and widespread
as it has, we may look to four factors to understand the virus and its global impact.
First, SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes the COVID-19 disease, is highly contagious,
easily spread through not only physical contact between people but also through
aerosol transmission via particles in the air. See How COVD-19 Spreads, CDC (Oct. 28,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covidspreads.html [https://perma.cc/TX84-WXWK]. Second, the virus has a far higher
rate of serious to fatal prognoses than found in other diseases like the flu. See Nick
Tate, What Changing Death Rates Tell Us About COVID-19, WEBMD (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20200901 /what-changing-death-rates-tell-usabout-covid [https://perma.cc/86UJ-4YQK] (noting that the mortality rate of COVID19 is six times that of the seasonal flu). Third, the virus has been fast-moving. Perhaps
due to the globalized nature of modern travel and supply chains, the virus spread very
quickly around the world, unlike other epidemics that have been more localized. See
Mineo, supranote 3 (discussing, in part, how air travel has increased the virulence of
COVID-19). Fourth, the virus can be invisible-that is, the potential for individuals to
carry and transmit the virus without showing any symptoms can make the virus difficult
to detect without specified testing. See ContractTracingand OtherInnovative Technological
Responses, supranote 5, at 9 (discussing debates over the efficacy of thermal imaging
cameras' ability to detect COVID-19 given that many who contract the virus do not
display detectable symptoms like a fever).
16. See, e.g., Jon Hamilton, How COVID-19 Attacks the Brain and May Cause Lasting
Damage, NPR (Jan. 5, 2021, 6:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2021 /01 /05/953705563/how-covid-9-attacks-the-brain-and-may-cause-lastingdamage [https://perma.cc/W3AB-8962] (discussing inflammation and other forms of
long-term brain damage from COVID-19); Monica Cortinovis et al., Long-Term Followup of Recovered Patientswith COVID-19, LANCET, Jan. 8, 2021, at 173, 174 (reporting on
a study that found seventy-six percent of the 1655 participants reported at least one
persistent symptom of the illness six months after onset).
17. See Alison Abbott, COVD's Mental-Health Toll: How Scientists Are Tracking a Surge
in Depression, NATURE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d4586-02100175-z [https://perma.cc/4MJP-RJN8]
(highlighting studies and surveys that
demonstrate an increase in anxiety and depression since the beginning of the pandemic).
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other health consequences, such as people not receiving necessary
medical care due to limited medical resources or fear of the virus. 18
Not only are people sick and dying, or mourning and caretaking, but
they are also suffering from the economic and social impacts of the
virus. Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their jobs in the
United States alone.19 The increase in unemployment is drastically
disproportionately affecting women, particularly Black and Latinx
women. 20 At the same time, many Americans have faced evictions and
homelessness. 21 The housing crisis has been so great that the federal
government imposed a moratorium on evictions in 2020 and extended
it in 2021.22
Due to the highly contagious, fast-spreading nature of the virus,
much of society has moved to a remote, online format, eschewing inperson contact as much as possible. While this has had negative
consequences, as I explore below, it has also had the benefit of helping
people remain safe and healthy. However, not all people are equally
able to realize that benefit. For example, while many white-collar

18. See Kelly E. Anderson et al., Reports ofForgoneMedical CareAmong US Adults During
theInitialPhase of the COVD-19 Pandemic,JAMA NETWORK OPEN,Jan. 21, 2021, at 1, 1.
19.

See GENE FALK ET AL.,

CONG.

RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: IN BRIEF 3 (2021) (illustrating that the national
unemployment rate in February 2020 was below four percent, but then skyrocketed to
nearly fifteen percent in April 2020).
20.

See Michelle Fox, Coronavirus Financial Stress Is Hitting Blacks and Hispanics

Disproportionately, Analysis Finds,
CNBC
(Oct.
15,
2020,
9:02
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/15/coronavirus-financial-stress-hits-blacks-andhispanics-more-than-whites.html [https://perma.cc/D4V9-TB27]; Courtney Connley,
More than 860,000 Women Dropped out of the Labor Force in September, According to New
Report, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/02/865000women-dropped-out-of-the-labor-force-in-september-2020. html
[https://perma.cc/8R7B-Y9MG].
21. SeeJacob Passy, COVD-19 Will Cause Twice as Much Homelessness as GreatRecession,
ResearchersSay, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 25, 2021, 6:36AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/covid-19-will-cause-twice-as-much-homelessness-as-great-recession-study-finds11610482333 [https://perma.cc/JZ9K-XM7Z] (projecting that homelessness will rise
by forty-nine percent over the next four years due to an anticipated "COVID-19-related
recession").
22. See Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of
COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Sept 4, 2020) (establishing a federal eviction
moratorium to prevent the spread of COVID-19); Temporary Halt in Residential
Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 16,713 (extending
the eviction moratorium to June 30, 2021); Lisa Rowan, CDC Extends Renters'Eviction
Moratorium Through March. Is More Rent Relief Next?, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2021, 12:54 PM),
https://www.forbes. com/advisor/personal-finance/biden-plan-eviction-moratoriumrent-relief [https://perma.cc/54P8-6RGZ].
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workers have been able to work from home, comparatively safe from
the contagious virus, many people are unable to shift their work to a
remote, online format, 23 including those-many of whom earn low
income-who work in jobs that are considered "essential" (e.g., jobs in
factories, supply chain companies, grocery stores, food service, and
hospitals).24 Contingent workers, including gig economy workers, have
also faced increased challenges in the economic downturn.2 5
Schools have moved online to varying extents,26 endangering people at
schools where in-person education remains or has resumed, while posing
other challenges for those who must learn remotely. Some schools have

23. Jennifer Liu, More than Halfof Black, Latino, NativeAmerican Workers HoldJobs thatRequire
in-PersonContact, CNBC (Dec. 2, 2020, 11:25 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/02/blacklatino-native-american-workers-face-higher-covid-19-exposure.html
[https://perma.cc/8GMBWS9Q]; see Celine McNicholas & Margaret Poydock, Who Are Essential Workers? A
Comprehensive Look at Their Wages, Demographics, and Unionization Rates, ECON. POL'Y INST.:

WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 19 2020, 11:25 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/who-areessential-workers-a-comprehensive-look-at-their-wages-demographics-and-unionizationrates [https://perma.cc/9MKM-ZRCE].
24. See McNicholas & Poydock, supranote 23. As many nations and states engaged
in lockdowns, mandating that businesses shut down, a class of essential businesses
developed.

See, e.g., CDC, GUIDANCE ON THE ESSENTIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

WORKFORCE (2020). In executing these lockdown orders, governments deemed certain
critical businesses essential to the functioning of society or the economy, thus
exempting them from shutdown orders. Employees of these essential businesses
continued working even when other businesses closed to comply with lockdown
mandates. COVID-19: Essential Workers in the States, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES

(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/covid-19essential-workers-in-the-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/25SL-WBJW].
25. See Aarian Marshall & Gregory Barber, CoronavirusExposes Workers to the Risks of
the Gig Economy, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/coronavirus-exposes-workers-risks-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/8MF7-RCBW]
(noting that gig economy workers, such as rideshare drivers, food delivery workers, and
pet sitters, are independent contractors who often receive no sick pay, workers'
compensation, or health benefits); UCLA LAB. CTR. & SEIU-UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS
W., WORKER OWNERSHIP, COVID-19, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GIG ECONOMY 2-3 (2020),

https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/UCLA_coop_report_FinalL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RGX-ES3] (surveying gig economy workers in California and
finding that half of those surveyed stopped working because of COVID-19, a significant
majority doing so out of fear of contracting the virus while working for companies that
did not address their health and safety concerns).
26. Stephen Sawchuk & Catherine Gewertz, Schools Are Retreatingto Remote Learning
as COVID-19 Surges. Do They Have to?, EDUC. WK.
(Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.edweek. org/leadership/schools-are-retreating-to-remote-learning-ascovid-19-surges-do-they-have-to/2020/11 [https://perma.cc/3D6L-L8YP].
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shifted entirely to remote classes, particularly in higher education.27
Others have pursued hybrid models. 28 With the shift away from
physical campuses, many students have suffered from disparities due
to income and access.2 9 Learning remotely requires computing
devices, fast and steady internet connections, and quiet spaces at
home.3 0 Very young children also have had difficulty fully utilizing
online education tools without parents who are present at home
during the day, disadvantaging children from low-income families and
whose parents are more likely to be working away from the home."
Even in families where one or both parents are at home during the
day, many children and parents have faced challenges with remote or
hybrid education, with mothers especially facing hardships.3 2 At the
same time, schools have faced budget freezes,33 and teachers across the

27. Wahab Ali, Online and Remote Learning in HigherEducation Institutes: A Necessity
in Light of COVID-19 Pandemic, 10 HIGHER EDUC. STUD. 16, 16-18 (2020); Sean
Gallagher & Jason Palmer, The PandemicPushed UniversitiesOnline. The Change Was Long
Overdue, HARV. Bus. REv. (Sept 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/09/the-pandemicpushed-universities-online-the-change-was-long-overdue [https://penna.cc/QDX5-7L7H].
28. Anna North, Hybrid School Might Be the Worst of Both Worlds, Vox (Oct. 19, 2020, 9:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/21515864/covid-hybrid-school-learning-remote-plan-pandemic.
29. See Can We Fix the Inequalities Exacerbated by Remote Learning?, PBS NEwsHOUR
(Aug. 29, 2020, 5:05 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/can-we-fix-theinequities-exacerbated-by-remote-learning [https://perma.cc/8A5V-MU4U] (arguing
that students who do not have reliable access to necessary technology suffer greater
academic harm due to remote learning and that it is the responsibility of government,
alongside schools, to ensure access for all students); Benjamin Herold, The Disparities
in Remote Learning Under Coronavirus (in Charts), EDUC. WK. (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.edweek. org/technology/the-disparities-in-remote-learning-undercoronavirus-in-charts/2020/04?print=1
[https://perma.cc/6X6U-Q3L6]
(charting
the disadvantages in access to technology and student engagement in schools with
higher percentages of low-income students).
30. See Can We Fix the InequalitiesExacerbated by Remote Learning?, supra note 29.
31. See id.
32. Jessica Grose, America's Mothers Are in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021 /02/04/parenting/working-moms-mental-healthcoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/275K-76EA] (examining how the pandemic has
particularly impacted mothers by forcing them to leave the workforce, increasing their
child care responsibilities, and exacerbating stress).
33. See Valerie Strauss, K-12 School Leaders Warn of Disaster'fromHuge CoronavirusRelated Budget Cuts as Layoffs and FurloughsBegin, WASH. POST (May 8, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/05/08/k-12-school-leaders-warndisaster-huge-coronavirus-related-budget-cuts-layoffs-furloughs-begin
[https://perma.cc/8GAN-6Z4G] (detailing state budget cuts that are causing school
districts to furlough teachers and reduce services).
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nation have contracted COVID-19, and even died from it, due to
teaching in person. 34
The risks involved with social contact have negatively impacted many
other segments of society. For example, many nursing homes have shut
down visits, some even sequestering residents in their own rooms,
without social contact with other residents or visitors.7 Senior citizens,
many of whom already suffered from loneliness and poverty, also lost
out on available means of social connection and support. 36 Some
people with health conditions and disabilities have found it more
difficult to seek treatment or support, including disabled children in
schools.3 7 In addition to elderly and disabled people, pregnant and
immunocompromised people have also faced greater limitations, as
heightened health risks associated with contracting COVID-19 have
altered these groups' assessment of the relative danger of gathering
with others.3 8

34. See Laura Ungar & SamanthaYoung, 'We Have Educators WhoAreDying': Teachers
Still FearCOVID-19, but Calls to Open Schools Grow Louder, USA TODAY (Feb. 7,2021, 11:29
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2021/02/07/reopeningschools-debates-teachers-fear-covid-19/4413729001 [https://perma.cc/2CP5-UNGD]
(highlighting teachers' demands that districts impose safety measures before resuming
in-person classes).
35. See Emily Paulin, Is Extended Isolation Killing Older Adults in Long-Term Care?,

AARP (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/caregiving/health/info-2020/covidisolation-killing-nursing-home-residents.html
[https://perma.cc/LY4G-8YPT]
(discussing the impact that pandemic-induced social isolation has had on the mental
and physical health of those in long-term-care facilities).
36. See Kara Gavin, Loneliness Doubledfor Older Adults in First Months of COVID-19,
UNIv. MICH. HEALTH LAB (Sept. 14, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://abblog.uofmhealth.org/
rounds/loneliness-doubled-for-older-adults-first-months-of-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/9FC-5TCD] (noting that the older adults who were polled were
attempting to reduce social interactions in order to protect their health, but then
suffered from the subsequent isolation).
37. See Andrew Pulrang, How Covid Relief Will Help Disabled People, and What Was Left
out, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewpulrang/

2021/03/11 /how-covid-relief-will-help-disabled-people-and-what-was-left-out/?sh=
758512e314fc [https://perma.cc/QH9U-ZVK2] (detailing the challenges for those
with disabilities during the pandemic, such as students being unable to receive the
assistance of one-on-one aides while schools provided only remote classes).
38. See Gwen Aviles, As Coronavirus Spreads, Immunocompromised Young PeopleAsk Peers
to Keep Them in Mind, NBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2020, 3:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/news/us-news/coronavirus-spreads-immunocompromised-young-people-ask-peerskeep-them-mind-n1160381
[https://perma.cc/JUS2-PULS]
(focusing on the
struggles of individuals who are at higher risk of contracting COVID-19 because they
are immunocompromised, despite appearing young and healthy).
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While the pandemic has wrought similar harm across the world,
every nation has approached pandemic response in different ways,
with some nations succeeding in keeping viral spread minimal and
others failing continuously- leaving their residents vulnerable to the
exponential spread of COVID-19. 39 In the United States, lack of a
centralized federal plan resulted in a fifty-state approach.40 Each state
has its own guidelines on shutdowns, coronavirus testing, vaccinations,
and more.4 1 In the early stages of the pandemic, supplies were critically
low. These supplies included personal protective equipment (PPE)
used by healthcare providers, as well as masks (to be worn ideally by all
people to minimize viral spread) and healthcare equipment like
ventilators.42 As cases increased, many areas experienced outages of
necessary healthcare supplies.4 3 At various points during the
pandemic, different areas ran out of ICU beds or even hospital beds."
Some states and nations even ran low on oxygen.45 America's fifty-state
39. See James H. Liu, Majority World Successes and European and American Failure to
Contain COVID-19: CulturalCollectivism and GlobalLeadership,24 ASIAN J. Soc. PSYCH. 23,

23-26 (2021).
40.

See Contract Tracing and Other Innovative Technological Responses, supra note 5, at

15-16.
41. E.g., 48 Md. Reg. 255 (Mar. 9, 2021) (updating Maryland's guidelines relating
to business capacities and other restrictions during the public health emergency); see
Dena Bunis &Jenny Rough, List of Coronavirus-RelatedRestrictions in Every State, AARP
(Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info2020/coronavirus-state-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/A9MV-S5TN] (compiling
a state-by-state list of restrictions related to opening of businesses, use of public spaces,
and other issues).
42. Megan L. Ranney et al., Critical Supply Shortages-The Need for Ventilators and
PersonalProtective Equipment During the Covid-19 Pandemic, NEW ENG. J. MED., Apr. 30,

2020, at 1; Erin Schumaker, How Did the US Come up so Short on PPE?, ABC NEws (Apr.
14, 2020,
10:59 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/us-short-ppe/story?id

=70093430 [https://perma.cc/47E9-QFUM].
43. See Ranney, supranote 42, at 1.
44. Lauren Leatherby et al., 'There'sNo Placefor Them to Go': I.C. U. Beds near Capacity
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/

2020/12/09/us/covid-hospitals-icu-capacity.html

[https://perma.cc/2D6Z-JYR7];

Dan Goldberg, "Overwhelmed": HospitalsEngulfed by Rebounding Virus, POLITICO (Oct. 16,
2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/16/pandemic-states-virusrebound-429753 [https://perma.cc/UNJ4-D3LJ].
45. Rae Ellen Bichell & Lauren Weber, In Los Angeles and Beyond, Oxygen Is the Latest
Covid Bottleneck, KHN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://khn.org/news/article/in-los-angeles-andbeyond-oxygen-is-the-latest-covid-bottleneck
[https://perma.cc/7P6-8L5K];
Fenit
Nirappil & William Wan, Los Angeles Is Running out of Oxygen for Patients as Covid
Hospitalizations Hit Record Highs Nationwide, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021 /01/05/covid-hospitalizations-losangeles-oxygen [https://perma.cc/CX29-JDB3].
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approach forced states to fend for themselves in the early stages of the
pandemic, negotiating on their own and in groups (as pacts) to
purchase necessary supplies."
In an unprecedented scientific triumph, pharmaceutical companies
rapidly developed vaccines and pursued emergency clinical trials to
test the vaccines' efficacy all in less than a year after the pandemic
began in earnest.47 While the vaccine developments have been promising,
the lack of supply has led to nations vying for vaccine doses, with wealthier

46. See, e.g., Full Remarks: Governor Larry Hogan Announces State of Maryland Acquires
500,000 COVID-19 Tests from South Korea's LabGenomics, MARYLAND.GOv
https://governor.maryland.gov/2020/04/20/full-remarks-governor-hoganannounces-state-of-maryland-acquires-500000-covid-19-tests-from-south-koreaslabgenomics [https://perma.cc/68XU-KPFK]; Steve Thompson, Maryland's Governor
Touts His Purchaseof Tests from South Korea. Emails Show a U.S. Company Offered Tests at a

Lower Price, WASH. POST (July 17, 2020, 1:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/md-politics/hogan-south-korea-coronavirus-tests/2020/07/16/c0e69ec8-c765-

11ea-a99f-3bbdffblaf38_story.html [https://perma.cc/D33U-EX2S].
47. See, e.g., Jon Cohen, Absolutely Remarkable': No One Who Got Moderna's Vaccine in
Trial Developed Severe COVD-19, Sci. MAG.
(Nov. 30, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https: //www.sciencemag. org/news/2020/ 11/absolutely-remarkable-no-one-who-gotmodernas-vaccine-trial-developed-severe-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/HSK9-7UAV]
(crediting federal funding for supporting the rapidity of vaccine development); Eric
Silberman, Pfizer Vaccine Shows 94% Effectiveness Against Asymptomatic Transmission of
COVID, ABC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/pfizervaccine-shows-94-effectiveness-asymptomatic-transmission-covid/story?id76389615
[https://perma.cc/8KVV-NRGC] (citing new data that the Pfizer vaccine is effective
against asymptomatic transmission). However, global activists have expressed concern
that intellectual property protections for the vaccine technology and corporate
interests will limit the spread of knowledge about and development of vaccines around
the world. Carmen Paun, Patent Fight Pits Rich Against Poor in Vaccine Race, POLITICO
(Dec
10,
2020,
10:00
AM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/globalpulse/2020/12/10/patent-fight-pits-rich-against-poor-in-vaccine-race-491105
[https://perma.cc/6S55-QJUE]. For example, while Oxford University originally
planned to release the vaccine specifications in an open-source manner, allowing for
other companies and countries to freely copy and create their own versions of the
vaccines, the Oxford team later changed its mind and sold the rights to AstraZeneca,
reportedly at the urging of Bill Gates.Jay Hancock, They Pledged to Donate Rights to Their
COVID Vaccine, Then Sold Them to Pharma, KHN (Aug. 25, 2020), https://khn.org/
news/rather-than-give-away-its-covid-vaccine-oxford-makes-a-deal-with-drugmaker
[https://perma.cc/UVT4-LGGA]. Here, critics claim that Oxford's decision not to
publicize this research has led to a limitation of supply and a lack of access to necessary
vaccines. See id. (quoting a Harvard Medical School epidemiologist claiming drug
manufacturers' receipt of exclusive rights to vaccine research provides no guarantees
that they will price vaccines to reasonably ensure broad access).
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nations buying most of the available vaccines on contract." Some
countries, particularly China and Russia, have engaged in vaccine
diplomacy, sending supplies to nations in need.4 9 Other nations,
including Singapore, Portugal, and Iraq, have expressed interest in
joining the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC), which
facilitates the collaboration between wealthier nations to provide
vaccine doses to eligible low- and middle-income counties. 0
At the time of writing, the pandemic is still raging, though
vaccinations have begun rolling out. As countries vaccinate their
populations and reopen businesses, schools, public spaces, and borders,
government health authorities are considering, and private entities are
developing, "vaccine verification systems" and "immunity passports" to
improve the surveillance and suppression of COVID-19 transmission
and allow increased access to public spaces and travel." The proliferation
of these technologies is just one illustration of privacy norms' broad shift
in deference to public health needs.
B. Contextualizing the Pandemic
The pandemic does not exist in a vacuum. The first humans to
contract the virus likely did so in the latter half of the year 2019 (hence

48. Megan Twohey et al., With FirstDibs on Vaccines, Rich CountriesHave 'Cleared the
Shelves,' N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/us/
coronavirus-vaccine-doses-reserved.html [https://perma.cc/2HTC-HVN7].
49. See Jonathan Tennebaum, China, Russia Steal a Vaccine Diplomacy March, ASIA
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021), https://asiatimes.com/2021/02/china-russia-steal-a-vaccinediplomacy-march [https://perma.cc/5J7S-GUFJ] (highlighting the steps Russia and
China have taken to help less-wealthy countries obtain the COVID-19 vaccine doses
they need more efficiently).
50. See 92 Low- and Middle-Income Economies Eligible to Get Access to COVD-19 Vaccines
Through Gavi COVAX AMC, GAvi (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/news/mediaroom/9 2-low-middle-income-economies-eligible-access-covid-9-vaccines-gavi-covaxamc [https://perma.cc/5RMR-Q2N6] (discussing the COVAX AMC and the ninetytwo nations with Gross National Income per capita under $400 that will be eligible to
receive vaccines through the COVAX program).
51. Baobao Zhang et al., Building Robust and Ethical Vaccination Verification Systems,
BROOKINGS TECHSTREAM (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/
building-robust-and-ethical-vaccination-verification-systems/; see also What Is a COVD19 Immunity Passport-andWho Will Get One? Here's What Experts Say, HEALTH (Dec. 10,
2020),
https://www.health.com/condition/infectious-diseases/coronavirus/covidimmunity-passport [https://perma.cc/86JU-KU2G] (discussing the history, benefits,
challenges, and applications of immunity passports); Mohapatra, supra note 13
(defining "immunity passports" and "vaccine passports" and explaining why the latter
have been a greater focus in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic).
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the naming of COVID-19 for this novel coronavirus).52 To understand
the state of privacy law at the time of this pandemic, and to
conceptualize solutions for protecting privacy in a time of pandemic,
we also must recognize the relevant social, political, economic, and
environmental factors that frame this particular point in time.
This Article will not attempt a comprehensive summary of the
entirety of the years 2019 to present. Similarly, as an American law
professor writing in an American law review, I recognize that my
perspective will be limited to an American-centric view of what are
really global issues. Instead, I will introduce only a few social, political,
economic, and environmental factors I find particularly salient for our
understanding of privacy in this time of pandemic. Understanding the
greater context surrounding the pandemic can allow us to develop
solutions to problems, including privacy problems, that reflect the
world as it is, instead of creating siloed solutions that do not work.
Future historians studying this particular moment in time will likely
say that the story of America in 2020 and into 2021 consisted of three
main events: (1) the pandemic; (2) the Black Lives Matter movement
and mass protests against racism; and (3) the election and political
environment of 2020. Of course, many other things happened as well.
But these are perhaps the three events without which you cannot
understand the conditions of America in the time of pandemic.
The pandemic exposed several of the structural inequalities
plaguing America and the world.53 But these social and political
problems had existed long before. America has suffered from the
disease of racism and xenophobia since its earliest days. The same
nation that can rightfully boast of being the world's oldest democracy
is also the same nation built on the blood of enslaved Black people, the
tears of Indigenous people driven from their lands, and the
mistreatment of immigrants from all around the world.
The inequalities that have historically existed in America are
important to understand when discussing privacy, as these tensions
have played a role in shaping the right to privacy. The right to privacy
developed in American jurisprudence through a patchwork of
theories, including constitutional protections (privacy as a civil liberty

52. See Michelle L. Holshue et al., First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United
States, 382 NEW ENG.J. MED. 929, 929 (2020) (recounting that the novel coronavirus
was first identified in a small group of people connected to the Huanan Seafood
Wholesale Market in Wuhan, China in December 2019).
53. See supra Section L.A (discussing the disproportionate impacts that the
coronavirus has wrought on certain populations).
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borne out of the penumbra of constitutional protections)" as well as
privacy in a civil context, primarily the "right to be let alone" as
conceived by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their landmark
article.55 These constitutional protections and tort protections have
never been awarded equally to all Americans. Privacy rights, like other
substantive rights, are difficult for most individuals to safeguard; those
traditionally marginalized by markets and legal systems have an even
higher burden in both understanding and enforcing their privacy
rights. 56 Privacy, however, has not only been a civil liberty or a tort
interest; privacy is also core to civil rights and indeed can be thought
of as a civil right in and of itself.57
In the summer of 2020, mass protests erupted across America related
to the Black Lives Matter movement. People protested the killing of
George Floyd, an unarmed Black man killed by police in an unprovoked
attack. 58 Millions of people worldwide participated in these protests,
potentially the largest mass protests in American history.59

54.

See generally STEPHAN P. MULLIGAN ET AL.,

CONG.

RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA

PROTECTION LAw: AN OVERVIEW 5-7 (2019) (outlining the development of the right to
privacy as a constitutional right in U.S. jurisprudence).
55. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.

193, 193 (1890).
56. See Matt Reichel, Race, Class, and Privacy: A CriticalHistoricalReview, 11 INT'LJ.
COMMC'N 4757, 4757-58, 4560 (2017) ("[T]he 'architecture' in which individuals
interact with technology is not neutral: It is, instead, reflective of extant societal
prejudices and power asymmetries."); Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big
Data: A Matrix of VulnerabilitiesforPoorAmericans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 58-64 (2017)
(summarizing the privacy vulnerabilities of low-income communities in the United
States); MARY MADDEN, DATA & SOc'Y RSCH. INST., PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND DIGITAL
INEQUALITY: How TECHNOLOGY EXPERIENCES AND RESOURCES VARY BY SOCIOECONOMIC

STATUS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY 2, 16, 17 (2017), https://datasociety.net/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/DataAndSocietyPrivacySecurityandDigitallnequality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3RK-43KF] (surveying the digital privacy inequalities of racial,
ethnic, and socioeconomic minorities).
57. Alvaro M. Bedoya, Privacy as a Civil Right, 50 N.M. L. REv. 301,306 (2020).
58. Amy Forliti, Prosecutors:Officer Was on Floyd's Neck for About 9 Minutes, AP NEWS
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/trials-derek-chauvin-minneapolis-racial-

injustice-060fle9e8b7079505alb096a68311c2b

(reporting on the criminal charges

brought against the ex-police officer who killed George Floyd by kneeling on his neck
until he stopped breathing).
59. See Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S.
History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07
/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/FY38-BHD6]
(approximating that fifteen to twenty-six million people protested George Floyd's death
in the United States between May 25, when the crime occurred, and July 3, 2020).
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At the same time as the Black Lives Matter movement spurred new
understandings of race relations in America, other social phenomena
unfolded. Although the World Health Organization (WHO) has
recognized the risk of stigmatization in associating an infectious
disease with a particular geographical location or group of people, 0
WHO guidelines did not stop many from calling the novel coronavirus
the "Wuhan Virus" once news broke that the virus likely originated in
Wuhan, China.61 2020 saw a great increase in hate crimes against Asians
and Asian Americans in the United States that has continued and
intensive since.62 At the same time, America still held thousands of
migrants and refugees in border detention camps, including hundreds
of children who were kept separated from their families-some
children even reportedly adopted into new families against the will of
their families of origin. 63 Furthermore, America saw a rise in antiSemitism, linked to the rise in alt-right white nationalists spurred on
by President Trump.64 All the while, America was still in the throes of
anti-Muslim sentiment-a holdover from the Islamophobic reactions

60.

See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION BEST PRACTICES

FOR THE NAMING OF NEW HUMAN INFECTIOUS DISEASES (2015)

(detailing the best

practices for naming a new disease to avoid offending or stigmatizing any group).
61. After use of the term "Wuhan Virus" became common, the World Health
Organization released a statement about how to properly refer to the virus. Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., Remarks at the Media
Briefing on 2019-nCoV (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/
speeches/detail/who-dire ctor-general-s-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-2019-ncovon-i1-february-2020 [https://perma.cc/6ZEV-3FXC].
62. See Madeleine Aggeler, The U.S. Is Seeing a Massive Spike in Anti-Asian Hate
Crimes, CUT (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/2021/02/the-us-is-seeing-amassive-spike-in-anti-asian-hate-crimes.html (reporting that the United States has seen
a 1900% increase in hate crimes against Asians and Asian-Americans in the past year
in NewYork City alone); ChristopherJohnson & TaraJohn, Atlanta Spa Attacks Shine a
Light on Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Around the World, CNN (Mar. 22, 2021),

https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/21 /world/anti-asian-hate-crime-intl/index.html
(describing how the shooting of six Asian women in Atlanta brought attention to the
increase of attacks against Asians throughout the world).
63. See, e.g., Garance Burke & Martha Mendoza, AP Investigation:Deported Parents
May Lose Kids to Adoption, APNEwS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/97b06ce

de0c149c492bf25a48cb6c26f (chronicling the anguishing story of Araceli Ramos Bonilla,
who nearly lost her two-year-old daughter, Alexa, after U.S. immigration authorities
deported Ramos).
64. SeeJames Cook, US Election: Trump and the Rise of the Alt-Right, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7,

2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37899026

[https://perma.cc/JE7Q

XBGU] (describing how then-presidential-candidate Donald Trump's rhetoric during
his 2016 campaign energized the alt-right and its use of sexist, racist, and anti-Semitic
language).
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to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulting in hate crimes
against not only Muslim Americans but also other South Asian and
Middle Eastern Americans.65
The exposure of and attention to racism and inequality of minority
groups in 2020 was a watershed event for America, one that is an
important factor to consider in understanding the pandemic's impact.
For example, if not for the Black Lives Matter protests, it is possible
that companies like ExamSoft, a remote testing software company, would
not have been held to account for using tools that underperformed for
people with darker skin tones.6 6 It is possible that newspapers would not
have so extensively covered the way the pandemic disproportionately
affected Black, Latinx, and other communities of color.67 If not for the
Black Lives Matter movement and related demonstrations, it is possible
that we might not have seen the solutions that have developed since then
to address inequities in COVID-19 response and in other facets of
society. 68 Finally, the increased attention to policing and the

65. See Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Rise of Anti-Muslim Violence, ATL. (Sept.
22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-muslimsislamophobia-hate-crime/500840
[https://perma.cc/6ACW-ZS2S]
(citing
research
suggesting that Donald Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric contributed to a spike in hate crimes).
66. See Khari Johnson, ExamSoft's Remote Bar Exam Sparks Privacy and FacialRecognition
Concerns, VENTUREBEAT (Sept 29, 2020, 9:07 AM), https://venturebeatcom/2020/09/
29/examsofts-remote-bar-exam-sparks-privacy-and-facial-recognition-concems
(referencing
the ACLU's challenge to the California State Bar's use of remote testing software for its
annual bar examination because it "threaten[ed] to further entrench racial and
economic inequities" within the legal profession).
67. Isaac Stanley-Becker & Lena H. Sun, Covid-19IsDevastatingCommunities of Color.
Can Vaccines Counter Racial Inequity?, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020, 1:00 PM),
https://www.wasingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/18/covid-vaccine-racial-equity
[https://perma.cc/QYQ3-MGT5]; Richard A. Oppel et al., The Fullest Look yet at the
Racial Inequity of Coronavirus,N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html
[https://perma.cc/2CR4-2YZ8]; Rong-Gong Lin II, Virus' Threat DeadlierforSome; L.A.
County's Black and Latino Groups Have Double the Mortality Rate of White Residents, L.A.

TIMES, June 27, 2020, at B.1.

68.

See Exec. Order No. 13,995, 86 Fed. Reg. 7193 (Jan. 26, 2021) (addressing the

"pervasive health and social inequities" that have surfaced as a result of the pandemic);
see also Ariana Eunjung Cha, Biden Makes Tackling Racial, Ethnic Inequities During
CoronavirusPandemic a Priority, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/2020/12/15/biden-covid-racial-inequities [https://perma.cc/M4PRW2YH] (discussing Marcella Nunez-Smith's appointment as one of three co-chairs to
lead President Biden's COVID-19 advisory board in ensuring an equitable pandemic
response).
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inequalities within the criminal justice system69 may have also
influenced people in America to further understand why privacy
violations by the government may create disparate harms for people
from marginalized populations, which may in turn impact how we
understand privacy in public health and pandemic response.
In addition to its overlap with an ongoing racial justice movement,
the pandemic found America in a time of political crisis, with a President
whom many believed to be incompetent at best and existentially
dangerous to democracy at worst.70 Political commentators attributed
Donald Trump's upset victory in 2016 to many factors, including years
of economic recession that had left many feeling the need to turn to
nationalistic rhetoric and an "America First" President.71 In 2020,
Americans had already suffered four years of democratic erosion, a
period of "constitutional rot"72 with peak political polarization and a
rising surge in authoritarian ideals perpetuated by many political

69.

See LEN ENGEL ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST, RACIAL

DISPARITIES AND COVID-19 4-10 (2020) (explaining how COVID-19 has exacerbated
existing issues with racial disparities in policing and the justice system); CRYSTAL
WATSON ET AL.,JOHNS HOPKINS UNIv., COVID-19 AND THE US CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM:
EVIDENCE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES TO REDUCE RISK 11-12 (2020) (detailing the

high rates of COVID-19 infection in incarcerated individuals and the lack of resources
in carceral facilities).
70. Cf How PopularIs Donald Trump?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 20, 2021, 11:57 AM),
https://proj ects.fivethirtyeight. com/trump-approval-ratings/?excid=irpromo
[https://perma.cc/2CL9-BMWA] (showing President Trump's 53.5% disapproval
rate in January 2020); Public's Mood Turns Grim; Trump Trails Biden on Most Personal

Traits, Major Issues, PEw RSCH. CTR. (June 30, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
politics/2020/06/30/publics-mood-turns-grim-trump-trails-biden-on-most-personaltraits-major-issues [https://perma.cc/CQP3-36W4] ("[T]he share of the public saying
they are satisfied with the way things are going in the country has plummeted from
31% in April, during the early weeks of the coronavirus outbreak, tojust 12% today.").
71. SeeJennifer Mercieca, A FieldGuide to Trump's DangerousRhetoric, CONVERSATION
(June 19, 2020, 8:09 AM), https://theconversation.com/a-field-guide-to-trumpsdangerous-rhetoric-139531 [https://perna.cc/V6X4-PQ59] (describing President
Trump's rhetorical approach as one portraying him as the American hero-"the
apotheosis of American exceptionalism"); see also Lily Rothman, The Long History
Behind Donald Trump's America First'Foreign Policy, TIME (Mar. 28, 2016, 6:14 PM),
https://time.com/4273812/america-first-donald-trump-history
[https://perma.cc/4TSC-T4TM]
(noting that President Trump presented his
Administration as one that would "prevent other nations from taking advantage of the
United States"); Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America,
Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017) ("From this day forward, a new vision will govern
our land. From this day forward, it's going to be only America first.").
72. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and ConstitutionalRot, 77 MD. L. REv. 147,

155, 157-58 (2017).
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leaders. 73 The Trump Administration broke constitutional norm after
constitutional norm. 4 At the same time, far-right, nationalistic, antidemocratic political forces gained or maintained presence in many
nations, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.75
As the pandemic raged through the United States, so did an
"infodemic": an epidemic of misinformation and disinformation
spreading through social media. Thousands of Americans fell prey to
disinformation and to radicalization, turning to the QAnon mass
delusion and to darker parts of the internet dedicated to organizing
people who shared a white-supremacist, proto-authoritarian agenda.76
President Trump supported much of this political fervor, which led to
the January 6, 2021 armed attack on the U.S. Capitol, in which hundreds
of Trump supporters stormed the Capitol, breached the gates, and
wrought death and destruction.77 The attempted insurrection resulted
73. SeeJames A. Gardner, Illiberalism and Authoritarianismin the American States, 70
AM. U. L. REv. 829, 863-67 (2021) (arguing that since 2016, there has been a "grafting
of authoritarian behavior" onto the Republican Party in the United States); PEw RSCH.
CTR.,

PARTISAN

ANTIPATHY:

MORE

INTENSE,

MORE

PERSONAL

1

(2019),

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/10/10-1019-Parties-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K8W-87X6] (surveying Americans' partisan
opinions and finding deepening division, animosity, and political polarization).
74. See Balkin, supra note 72, at 147, 149, 158-59 (discussing President Trump's
disruption of democratic norms as a form of "constitutional rot"); Dawn Johnsen,
TowardRestoringRule-of-Law Norms, 97 TEX. L. REv. 1205, 1205-07 (2019) (claiming that
President Trump's "extraordinary misconduct" contributed to the corrosion of
constitutional norms); Neil S. Siegel, PoliticalNorms, Constitutional Conventions, and
PresidentDonald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 177-78 (2018) (describing Trump's "disregard
of [all] political norms" as the most dangerous aspect of his conduct in office).
75. See Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-by-Country Guide, BBC NEws
(Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006.
76. See Shadi Shahsavari et al., Conspiracyin the Time of Corona:Automatic Detection of
Emerging COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories in Social Media and the News, 3 J. COMPUTATIONAL

Soc. Sci. 279, 280, 296, 307 (2020) (discussing how misinformation around the
pandemic exacerbated pre-existing conspiracy theories like QAnon); see also Samara
Lynn, How the Far-RightHarnessedTech in the Lead-up to the Capitol Riot, ABC NEWS,

(Jan.

28, 2021, 1:48 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/harnessed-tech-lead-capitolriot/story?id=74761628 [https://perma.cc/6PJ8-MAU2] ("The right-wing corners of
the internet, which include some of Trump's most ardent supporters, white
supremacists and militia members, have harnessed technology to amplify their

ideology. . . .").
77. See Shelly Tan et al., How One of America's UgliestDays UnraveledInside and Outside
the Capitol, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/
interactive/2021/capitol-insurrection-visual-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/J3RS-6RG6];
Ryan Goodman et al., Incitement Timeline: Year of Trump's Actions Leading to the Attack on

the Capitol,JUST SEC. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74138/incitementtimeline-year-of-trumps-actions-leading-to-the-attack-on-the-capitol
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from political division that reached a height in the 2020 election,
particularly after Trump's team continually contested the lawful
election of a new President, Joe Biden, and a new political makeup
with Democrats holding the executive and both houses of Congress.78
The infodemic, and potentially the rise of Donald Trump and the
global turn to authoritarianism, can be linked to the rising power of
technology platforms, including social media companies like
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.79 Thus, despite the important role
technology plays in pandemic response, increased skepticism towards
the politicization of tech platforms has likely taken a toll on the
public's willingness to trust corporations with their digital privacy. 80
The world faced a shift in global powers with the rise of China, 81
rapid growth in the Global South, 82 and a technology-fueled future. As
world economies turn to technology, we see a greater increase in use
of data and privacy-violative technologies, including the rise of the
Internet of Things and connected technologies, as well as Al and
machine learning, with significant impacts on privacy worldwide. And

[https://perma.cc/YM7B-3QEH] (providing a timeline of the events that unfolded at
the Capitol on January 6, 2021).
78. Goodman et al., supra note 77.
79. See, e.g.,Joseph Thai, Facebook's Speech Code and Policies:How They Suppress Speech
and Distort DemocraticDeliberation, 69 AM. U. L. REv. 1641, 1643, 1645 (2020) (discussing
the enormous impact Facebook's speech policies have on billions of people, increasing
the risk of disinformation exposure);JANNA ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEw RSCH. CTR.,
MANY TECH EXPERTS SAY DIGITAL DISRUPTION WILL HURT DEMOCRACY 3

(2020),

https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2020/02/
PI_2020.02.21_future-democracy_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ6QXM5V]
("Over the past four years-a time of the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom, the
American presidential election and a variety of other elections-the digital disruption
of democracy has been a leading concern.").
80.

Cf Lee Rainie, Americans' Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of

Privacy Concerns, PEw RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-ofprivacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/3MDV-D8HU] (reporting that 91% of Americans
believe that they have no control over how third parties collect and utilize their
personal data).
81.

SeeYen Nee Lee, Here Are 4 Charts that Show China's Rise as a Global Economic

Superpower, CNBC (Sept. 23, 2019, 9:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/24/
how-much-chinas-economy-has-grown-over-the-last-70-years.html
[https://perma.cc/W9LX-6E4H] (noting that China has been the world's second
largest economy behind the United States since 2010, when China surpassed Japan).
82.

UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEv., FORGING A PATH BEYOND BORDERS:

THE GLOBAL SOUTH 4 (2018) ("The [Global] South's contribution to growth of world
trade reached about 50% in the 2000s.").
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behind all of this is a global climate crisis worsening by the day. 83
Indeed, some theorize that climate change was one of the factors that
led to the COVID-19 pandemic and will lead to more pandemics in the
near future. 84
Understanding this maelstrom of social ills is crucial to contextualize
the story of privacy during a pandemic. If we do not recognize the
social and political factors surrounding the United States and the
world during this time of pandemic, we cannot truly understand why
it is that the pandemic affected the country and world in the ways that
it did, nor can we understand the context behind the specific
technology and public health responses that developed, resulting in
impacts on privacy. In evaluating our responses to privacy in a
pandemic, any new proposals for solutions must account for the
greater social and political context to be relevant and useful.
II. PRIVACY IN THE PANDEMIC ERA

How can we begin to understand privacy in a pandemic? In a prior
work, I mapped out the terrain of privacy issues that have arisen during
this pandemic.85 Here, I will highlight the most salient developments
in both public health responses and technological responses I believe to
be important in framing post-pandemic privacy law, as well as the key
social norms that we have seen change or shape our understandings of
privacy in this time.
A. The Public Health Response and Privacy
Public health responses to the coronavirus pandemic have necessitated
an astronomical increase in collection of not only health-related data, but
also other personal data as well. 86 Public health initiatives like coronavirus
testing, contact tracing (both manual and digital), vaccine verification,
and telemedicine and telehealth require health and other information
83. Henry Fountain, A World Speeding Dangerously Close' to a Tipping Point, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2019, at A10 (describing climate change's acceleration as "more urgent
than ever").
84. SeeJeff Goodell, How Climate Change Is Ushering in a New PandemicEra, ROLLING
STONE (Dec. 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturefeatures/climate-change-risks-infectious-diseases-covid-19-ebola-dengue-1098923
[https://perma.cc/P73Z-6EEC] (explaining that climate change is one of the main
reasons for "this new era of pandemics" because it is causing more animals to migrate
and interact with other animals and humans-at a higher rate and while carrying
diseases-in a way they never have before).
85. See Li, supra note 1, at 7.
86. Id. at 5, 7.
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from individuals at massive scale. 87 We have also seen greater use of
technology in healthcare, including medical Al used for triage, and
even healthcare robots.88
While data collection has grown, however, lacking access to data has
caused issues for pandemic management and response. In a sense,
privacy law restrictions may have hampered some public health
pandemic responses. For example, many states did not publish data on
PPE supply, available hospital beds, coronavirus cases, coronavirusrelated deaths, and more. 89 Additionally, the federal government
concealed COVID-19 data at a national level under Trump's
leadership.9 0 Indeed, in many cases, the White House held the CDC
back from sharing data that could have helped the public.91 Similarly,
restrictions on data sharing and cooperation may have limited the
efficacy of some public health responses, including digital contact
tracing apps. For example, many contact tracing apps did not sync with
each other, creating an interoperability problem that prevented a fully
national rollout of digital contact tracing.9 2

87. Robert A. Fahey & Airo Hino, COVID-19, DigitalPrivacy, and the Social Limits on
Data-FocusedPublic Health Responses, 55 INT'LJ. INFO. MGNT 1,1-2 (2020).
88. Li, supra note 1, at 5.
89. See Allan Smith, 'I'mLookingfor the Truth': States Face Criticismfor COVID-19Data
Cover-Ups, NBC NEWS (May 25, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/politics-news/i-m-looking-truth-states-face-criticism-covid-9-data-n1202086
[https://perma.cc/4LZ6-HSKY] (noting discrepancies between states' reported
COVID-related deaths and the actual number of COVID-related deaths, which is
'almost certainly' higher").
90. See Michael Halpern, White House Hides COVD-19 Data, Will Make the Pandemic
Even
Worse,
UNION
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS
(July 16,
2020,
5:35 PM),
https: //blog.ucsusa.org/michael-halpem/white-house-hides-covid-19-data-will-makethe-pandemic-even-worse
[https://perma.cc/7NMJ-2S45]
(describing Trump's
orders to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to stop collecting
data as an action that would "sabotage[]" the United States' ability to slow the spread
of the coronavirus).
91. See Jason Dearen et al., White House Puts 'Politicals'at CDC to Try to Control Info,
AP NEwS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-virus-outbreak-

pandemics-public-health-new-york-e321f4c9098b4db4dd6bl eda76a5179e?s=03
(reporting on the appointment of CDC employees to "control the information"
released by the CDC to "paint a positive outlook" on the pandemic, an effort that was
"at odds with the scientific evidence").
92. See Tiffany C. Li, Even the Best Contact Tracing App Needs a National COVID Plan
to Work, MSNBC (Oct. 22, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/evenbest-contact-tracing-app-needs-national-covid-plan-work-nl 244176
[https://perma.cc/8TC-F58R] (articulating the limitations to contact tracing
applications that are incompatible with other states' contact tracing applications).
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The actors who collect, share, use, and access health-related data are
a combination of public actors and private actors, traditional
healthcare institutions and others. 93 This is important to consider
because many of our privacy and health privacy laws target only specific
types of entities or institutions.9 4 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 199695 (HIPAA), for example, protects health
information transmitted from or to a covered entity or its business
associate.9 6 In practice, this might not actually cover entities like a
private company that runs a contact tracing app.9 7
A long history of public health research has led to the developments
we have seen in terms of public health responses for this pandemic. 98
However, there have been some changes, including new public health
responses as well as traditional public health responses conducted at
greater scale and speed, or by different actors than those previously
involved. 99 For example, contact tracing has been a widely accepted
practice in public health for epidemic response for decades.0 0

93.

U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1-2

(last revised May 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pivacysummary.pdf

[https://perma.cc/9AUC-JU3A]; see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (discussing the
definition of "business associate" as a "covered entity" under HIPAA).
94. See Evolution of HealthcarePrivacy, supra note 9, at 2-3 n.il (explaining HIPAA's
definition of "covered entit[ies]" in its Privacy Rule). See generally Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
95. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C).
96. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
97. See, e.g., Carmel Shachar, ProtectingPrivacy in Digital Contact Tracingfor COVID19: Avoiding

a

Regulatory Patchwork, HEALTH

AFF.

BLOG

(May

19,

2020),

https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200515.190582/full
[https://perma.cc/UG4K-UHM4] (noting that companies like Google and Apple are
not considered a covered entity under HIPAA and, therefore, HIPAA's regulations do
not apply to any contact tracing applications they develop).
98. See Andis Robeznieks, COVID-19Is Transforming Public Health. It's Not the First
Time, AM. MED. ASS'N (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/deliveringcare/health-equity/covid-9-transforming-public-health-it-s-not-first-time
[https://perma.cc/8MMP-BYTH] (describing three major revolutions in public
health since the 1918 influenza pandemic).
99. See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE: A
GUIDE FOR LEADERS AND RESPONDERS 6, 15-17 (2007) (depicting traditional public
health response protocol that remains relevant in modern times).
100. See Amy Lauren Fairchild et al., Contact Tracing's Long, Turbulent History Holds
Lessons
for
COVID-19,
CONVERSATION
(July
16,
2020,
8:15
AM),
https://theconversation. com/contact-tracings-long-turbulent-history-holds-lessonsfor-covid-19-142511 [https://perma.cc/BN9D-D5WP] ("[C]ontact tracing has been a
staple of infectious disease control since the 1920s.").
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However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing was done at
great scale and speed, globally. 10 1 Additionally, while traditional contact
tracing relies on human effort in identifying and tracing contacts, this
pandemic saw a wave of digital contact tracing applications, which
supplanted human (or manual) contact tracing efforts. 10 2 While some
public health responses, like contact tracing, may have been traditional
methods pursued in new or different ways, other public health
responses use methods and technology that are new themselves.
Medical Al and healthcare robots, for example, are both relatively
new. 103 Use of technology to respond to the pandemic-whether based
on traditional or new concepts-has exposed gaps in existing privacy
law. Modern privacy laws largely do not adequately protect the privacy
of individuals given the development of new technologies like medical
Al or the increased and digitized use of traditional public health
responses like contact tracing.
B. Privacy Impacts Beyond Public Health Response

In addition to public health responses related to the COVID-19
pandemic-many of which have involved technology and posed privacy
concerns-a wave of new technological developments, new uses of
existing technology, and intrusion on privacy has occurred in response
to other pressures of the pandemic.
First, workplace surveillance-both for remote and in-person workershas increased substantially. In-person workers have been subject to privacyviolating initiatives such as temperature checks at the doors of
warehouses. 10 4 Remote work surveillance has included "tattleware"

101. See generally Washington & Rhue, supra note 13 (describing digital contact
tracing, which has allowed contact tracing to provide more information quicker,
though not without limitations).
102. See generally id.
103. See NCS, AI-Powered Solutions in Tackling COVID-19 and Beyond, HEALTHCARE IT
NEWS (Dec. 14, 2020, 9:27 PM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/asiapacific/ai-powered-solutions-tackling-covid-19-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/Z9U6WUNA] (describing how recent technological advances in Al may serve as a solution

to COVID-19).
104. Justine Phillips et al.,

Employee Privacy Forecast: Temperature Checks, SHEPPARD
MULLIN LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog
.com/2020 /03/articles/coronavirus/employee-privacy-forecast-temperature-checks/
#:~:text=like [https://perma.cc/2QVC-BJQA]; David J. Oberly, COVMD-19 Employee
Temperature Screening: Key Workplace Privacy Considerationsfor Employers, CINCINNATI BAR
Ass'N (July 15, 2020), https://www.blankrome.com/publications/covid-19-employeetemperature-screening-key-workplace-privacy-considerations-employers

[https://perna.cc/39KC-KC2U].
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technologies that allow employers to spy on and record employees'
activities on company devices or websites. 10 5 The shift to remote work
has also created an increase in usage of remote-connected websites and
apps, like Zoom, Slack, Google Drive, Dropbox, and more. 106
The pandemic has also changed the way privacy is handled in the
education sector. Students venturing on campus now have to accept
more privacy incursions related to health measures. For example,
many schools require students to report their medical symptoms and
health status daily or at least on the days they visit campus. 10 7 Students
learning online have to accept the privacy practices of every remote
technology that schools insist on using. 10 8 While some of these
education sites and apps may have strong privacy protections in place,

105. Bobby Allyn, Your Boss Is Watching You: Work-from-Home Boom Leads to More
Surveillance, NPR (May 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/13/
854014403/your-boss-is-watching-you-work-from-home-boom-leads-to-moresurveillance [https://perma.cc/2UZ6-JT28]; see Ashleigh Webber, PwC Facial
Recognition Tool CriticisedforHome Working Privacy Invasion, PERs. TODAY (June 16,2020),
https://www.personneltoday. com/hr/pwc-facial-recognition-tool-criticised-for-homePwC's
(detailing
[https://perma.cc/R6YY-HESL]
working-privacy-invasion
implementation of facial recognition software to record when employees are away
from their computer screens while working from home).
106. John Case, Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Slack Have Exploded Due to the COVID-19
Pandemic. Can They Hold onto This Growth?, GLG
(Apr.
1,
2020),
https: //glginsights.com/articles/zoom-microsoft-teams-and-slack-have-exploded-dueto-the-covid-19-pandemic-can-they-hold-onto-this-growth
[https://perma.cc/ND6XWRKR] ; Yevgeniy Sverdlik, How Zoom, Netflix, and Dropbox Are Staying OnlineDuring the
Pandemic, DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.datacenter
knowledge. com/uptime/how-zoom-netflix-and-dropbox-are-staying-online-duringpandemic; cf Duncan Riley, Coronavirus Pandemic Drives Huge Demand for Google
Classroom App, SILICONANGLE (Mar. 29, 2020), https://siliconangle.com/2020/
03/29/coronavirus-pandemic-drives-huge-demand-google-classroom-app
[https://perma.cc/8ED3-H4LQ] (explaining that Google Classroom includes other
Google services like Google Drive, among others).
107. See, e.g.,Jesse Kirsch, Elmhurst SchoolDistrict205 Plansto Saliva Test Students; Some
Parents Question if It's Legal, ABC7 CHI.
(Feb. 25, 2021, 8:43 PM),
https://abc7chicago.com/saliva-test-elmhurst-schools-district-205-covid/10371249
[https://perma.cc/RC7D-GH4Y] (surveying a Chicago school district's efforts to
reopen schools by performing saliva tests on students despite parents' belief that such
a measure is "unethical and illegal"); FAQ-Health & Safety, AM. U. (last visited May 14,
2021),
https://www.american.edu/coronavirus/faq-health-and-safety.cftn#health4
(providing one university's daily self-screening tool that all individuals must submit
prior to entering the campus premises).
108. Christina Caron, How to Protect YourFamily's Privacy DuringRemote Learning, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/parenting/onlineschool-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/4RAL-LKDD].
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many do not.109 Importantly, applicable privacy laws like the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act" (COPPA) and the Family Education
Rights Protection Act"1 (FERPA) do not protect against all abuses of
privacy but rather are limited to specific contexts, types of information,
and actors.11 2 Accordingly, rights to educational privacy are limited.1 3
In the social space, norms for privacy have also shifted. Due to social
distancing and lockdown protocols, many people have migrated online
to socialize with others." 4 This has resulted in an uptick in user adoption
of tools like Zoom, formerly known as being only an enterprise videoconferencing work application, for consumer, personal, or social
purposes.1
The role of surveillance and technology has created new norms for
privacy, including blurry lines between work, school, and play, which I
highlight in the next Section. Not only has the COVID-19 pandemic
109.

See Tyler Sonnemaker, As Zoom Classes Take over During the Pandemic, Edtech

Companies Provide a Lifeline, but Only for Schools and Parents Willing to Surrender Their

Students'Privacy, Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/virtual-learning-privacy-tech-teachers-parents-schools-student-data-2020-10
[https://perma.cc/6ZU-PNAK] (highlighting how many online learning tools lack
sufficient privacy safeguards to prevent "'Zoom bombing' ... , unwitting data sharing,
and creepy digital test proctoring").

110. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2861 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2018)).
111. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 571 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 12 3 2(g)
(2018)).
112. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(1)-(2), 6501(10) (a), 6502(b) (1) (limiting COPPA's
jurisdiction to individuals younger than thirteen years old who use a website and to
"website[s] or online service [s] directed to children" that collect personal information

from the children); 20 U.S.C. §§ 12 3 2(g) (a) (1) (A), 1232(g)(a)(4)(A)-(B) (explaining
that if a school receives federal funding, parents have a right to inspect their child's
"education records," but excluding from this definition various categories of information).

113.

See 20 U.S.C. § 12 3 2(g) (a) (4) (B) (i)-(iv) (explaining the types of information

that are not included as an "educational record" under FERPA); see also Students: Your
Right to Privacy, AM. CIv. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/students-yourright-privacy [https://perma.cc/9YD8-8Z2] (stating that students have fewer privacy
rights in a public school than if they were outside of the school, due to, for example,
teachers' ability to legally search students without a warrant if the teacher has
reasonable grounds to suspect the search will provide evidence that the student has
violated the law or school rules (citing NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 340-42

(1985))).
114. Caity Weaver et al., True Tales of QuarantinedSocializing NY. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/style/coronavirus-quarantine-socializing.html
[https://perma.cc/R8DB-7Y64].
115. See id. (explaining myriad ways individuals are using videos conferencing apps
like Zoom to socialize, such as playing video games, attending virtual raves, or
participating in Alcoholics Anonymous).

1708

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1681

changed our society's privacy norms, but it has also exposed the
limitations of current laws and regulations governing privacy, technology,
and public health. Legal solutions must include both a direct response
to current needs as well as long-term structural change. Ideally, insights
gleaned from this pandemic can lead to better law for the next public
health emergency.
C. ChangingPrivacy Norms
Just as the law changes to reflect the changing mores and norms of
society, so too does our conception of privacy. Earlier in this Article, I
discussed some of the ways in which other social and political factors
of this contemporary moment in time may have influenced our current
understanding of privacy norms." 6 Beyond these social and political
factors, the pandemic's global impact has also fostered a shift in privacy
norms. The three norm shifts I outline in this Section are: (1) a
blurring of the divide between cyber and physical space; (2) a changing
relationship between privacy and public health; and (3) an increased
focus on digital inequities.
Perhaps the most obvious of norm shifts has been the erosion of the
line between cyber and physical space. As countries and states enforced
lockdowns, more of life moved to an online context.11 7 Use of online
communication means for multiple sectors of life-work, school, and
play-has blurred the lines between them. This erosion has changed
the way we understand privacy. Previously, people may have had
different expectations of privacy at school, at work, and at home.
However, during the pandemic, these spaces have become conflated
and combined, changing expectations of privacy in each of these
spaces. There is something lost now in terms of privacy when everyone
in all of these spaces can have the same access to your information and,
in some cases, the visual contents of your home.
As more of our lives move online, data privacy in an online context
is no longer as abstract as it was before. Historically, people have
viewed, and the courts have treated, bodily privacy or physical privacy

+

116. See supra Section I.B (highlighting important events that occurred in 2020 to
contextualize these changes).
117. Minh Hao Nguyen et al., Changes in Digital CommunicationDuring the COVD-19
Global Pandemic: Implications for Digital Inequality and Future Research., Soc. MEDIA
Soc'Y,July-Sept. 2020, at 1,1-2; see supranotes 6-7 and accompanying text; cf. Sections
IIA-B.
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as distinct from data or information privacy. 118 The more we live our
lives in an online and digital environment, or in a physical
environment mediated by connected technologies, the more we
collapse that divide between cyber and physical and, correspondingly,
the divide between physical privacy and information privacy. This
creates a context collapse of sorts, as individuals are forced to reconcile
the previously separate contexts in which they presented and
performed different facets of their identities.11 9
This blurring of the cyber and physical divide is an important norm
shift to contemplate when thinking about how to protect privacy in this
time of pandemic and beyond. Legal and regulatory solutions that seek
to protect privacy must address both physical and informational
privacy challenges, including measures to protect privacy as necessary
for different contexts, in line with what Helen Nissenbaum has called
"contextual integrity."120 For example, laws protecting educational
privacy must not only protect student records and information, but

118. See Jan Holvast, History of Privacy, in THE FUTURE OF IDENTITY IN THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 13, 16 (Vashek MatyAs et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009) (explaining how
there are two distinguishable dimensions of privacy: territorial or bodily privacy and
informational privacy); Annual Symposium Panel Discussion Materials, Surveillance and
Privacy in the Pandemic,AM. U. L. REV. 1-3 (Feb. 4, 2021), http://www.aulawreview.org/
au_law_review/wp-content/uploads/2021 /02/Surveillance-and-Privacy-in-thePandemic-i.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VBH-NXQG]
[hereinafter Surveillance and
Privacy in the Pandemic] (explaining the Whalen decision enunciating the two interests
in the right to privacy, namely the individual interest in avoiding personal disclosure
and interest in independence in decision making (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,

599-600 (1977))). Compare Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016)
(articulating the heightened bodily privacy concerns surrounding law enforcement
officers' attempts to obtain a blood alcohol concentration reading from a motorist
suspected of drunk driving through a blood test), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001) (holding that law enforcement officers' deployment of technological
tools "not in general public use" to obtain details about the inside of a person's home
that are not otherwise ascertainable without physical entry constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment), with Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600 (discussing a string of cases
involving two strains of privacy interests, namely "the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" and "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions"), and Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562

U.S. 134, 159 (2011) (holding that the information NASA sought on a background
check form does not, in this case, offend a right to informational privacy rooted in the
Constitution).
119. Danah Boyd, Faceted ID/Entity: Managing Representation in a Digital World.
Cambridge (Aug. 9, 2002) (M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file
with MIT Media Lab).
120.

HELLEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,

INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE

2 (2009).
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also the privacy of the physical campus environment. Laws that protect
only physical privacy or only informational privacy will quite soon
become obsolete, especially as the pandemic accelerates the blurring
of the divide between online and offline spaces.
Another norm shift has been the changing relationship between
privacy and public health. As the pandemic has impacted every part of
life, norms have changed involving the role of public health in society.
Increasingly, public health has become a justification for any number
of privacy violations. 121 In the middle of an active pandemic, it is hard
for anyone to object to a public health response or a new use of
technology that might hasten the end of the pandemic or lessen the
toll on the humans living through it. It is comparatively easy to justify
almost anything aimed at mitigating the pandemic's effects, even
unregulated technologies that violate privacy or public-private health
partnerships that give corporations and the government unprecedented
access to sensitive health data.
Americans are rapidly becoming more accustomed to privacy
violations done in the name of public health,just as Americans became
accustomed to privacy violations done in the name of public safety in
the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11, 2001.122 However, this
norm shift is important to recognize as a warning bell. It is very difficult
to roll back privacy-invasive technologies and overreach by governments
or corporations. 123 Thus, we must remain vigilant in studying how laws
121. Shachar, supranote 97; see Marissa B. Cohen, The Confusion over Privacy:HIPAA,
the Constitution, and COVD-19, NAT'L L. REv., June 2, 2020 (articulating government
attempts to diminish privacy laws as it tried to prevent the spread of COVID-19); see
also Maggie Miller, Democrats Introduce Measure to Boost Privacy, Security of Health Data

During Pandemic, THE HILL (Jan. 28, 2021, 4:50 PM), https://thehill.com/
policy/cybersecurity/536379-democrats-introduce-measure-to-boost-privacy-securityof-health-data [https://perma.cc/69LL-HCX2]
(quoting U.S. Senator Richard
Blumenthal, who stated-following his introduction of new legislation to modernize
privacy protections-that private health data would "be used to stop the spread of this
disease, and no more").
122. Surveillance and Privacy in the Pandemic, supranote 118, at 4-5.
123. See Mike Giglio, Would You Sacrifice Your Privacy to Get out of Quarantine?,ATL.
(Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/coronaviruspandemic-privacy-civil-liberties-911/609172 [https://perma.cc/S5WN-VXJU] (recounting
a conversation with ex-CIA employee Douglas London, who explained that while he does
not endorse it, COVID-19 legislation permitting an invasion of personal privacy would
be helpful to fight the pandemic, just as the PATRIOT Act gave the government
powerful surveillance tools to combat terrorism following the terror attacks of
September 11, 2001); cf Surveillance and Privacy in the Pandemic, supra note 118, at 2-5
(detailing the various security measures countries have implemented that impact
individual privacy rights in an attempt to thwart the spread of COVID-19).
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can protect privacy, even when public health is at stake-as it is during
an active global pandemic.
Luckily, this pandemic has shown us that maximally privacypreserving methods do exist as viable options for many public health
and technology responses. For example, digital contact tracing
applications can be built to preserve their users' private information,
and even as open-source apps, as Google and Apple's exposure
notification tools demonstrated.1 24 Instead of blindly giving up our
privacy for the sake of unknown benefits to public health, we should
continue to seek the privacy-preserving methods of achieving our
public health goals. Privacy and public health are not mutually
exclusive values, and our society needs both to function.
Finally, the pandemic has thrown into sharp relief the inequalities
inherent in our social and political systems. COVID-19 has exacerbated
inequities that minority populations face in a variety of settings,
including employment, education, and living conditions. 125 Although
it is still early, I am hopeful that we are witnessing a norm shift in
thinking about structural and institutional inequalities in our
society. 126 That shift in thinking will necessarily impact the way we
understand privacy too, and hopefully, we will become more aware as
a society of the ways in which privacy differently affects people from
different parts of society.1 2 7 Post-pandemic privacy law must take
inequities into account and protect privacy for all people.

124. See Surveillance and Privacy in the Pandemic, supranote 118, at 8-9 (detailing how
Apple and Google cautioned the public that their contact tracing application would
not track users' locations or reveal the identities of infected individuals to the platform
companies or government).
125. See, e.g., supranotes 20-21, 29-38 and accompanying text.
126.

See, e.g., UGURYILDIRIM, UNIV. OF CAL., PERCEPTIONS OF INEQUALITY DURING THE

CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK 22 (2020) (showing that people felt perceptions about class
inequalities more strongly in the context of the pandemic); Cristina G. Mora et al.,
Perceptions of Inequality and the Pandemic Vary Drastically Among Californians, U.C.
STUD. (MAY 13, 2020), https://escholarship.org/
uc/item/5f07q09c#main (finding that most Californians recognized that the COVID19 pandemic was hitting Black populations the hardest); Dylan Wiwad et al.,
BERKELEY: INST. GOVERNMENTAL

Recognizing the Impact of COVID-19 on the Poor Alters Attitudes Towards Poverty and

Inequality, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH., Nov. 14, 2020, at 1, 6 (finding that individuals
exposed to those suffering from poverty due to the COVID-19 pandemic experienced
an increased willingness to help).
127. See Reichel, supra note 56, at 4757 (identifying a widening data privacy gap
between individuals who can afford more expensive cell phones like iPhones, which
come with default encryption, and people whose cell phones often lack default
encryption).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The pandemic has shifted the way our society understands privacy,
which will have long-lasting effects. 128 While it may be understandable
that many sought to sacrifice privacy for the sake of public health
(whether through greater collection of data, new uses of privacyinvasive technology, or other means), it is still critical to consider how
to stop the erosion of privacy before it is too late. This Section provides
a framework for evaluating forward-looking privacy law proposals and
then examines some statutory and regulatory solutions.
A. A Frameworkfor Post-PandemicPrivacy Law

Any legislative proposal focused on post-pandemic privacy ought to
keep the following considerations in mind: (1) post-pandemic privacy
law must address the entire data ecosystem; (2) post-pandemic privacy
law must address systemic inequities; and (3) post-pandemic privacy
law must be sustainable.
Post-pandemic privacy law must seek to cover the entire data
ecosystem, recognizing the interconnected nature of data and
information, particularly given the rise of Al and machine learning
technologies. 129 Because the COVID-19 pandemic has intersected with
other major world events, one can only fully understand the
pandemic's impact in the context of those concurrent events. 130
Relatedly, data created, collected, and utilized during this pandemic
will have far-flung effects on privacy far after the pandemic has ended.
Whatever laws and legal norms we create to address this pandemic will
not be isolated to this pandemic. The laws enacted in response to the
pandemic and the legal norms arising from them will have lasting
effects on society because (1) the health data created and obtained
during the pandemic will continue to exist, with downstream harms
being so distributed, 131 (2) norms will have changed and continue
128. See supranotes 122-23 and accompanying text.
129. See supraSections II.A-B (discussing the proliferation of new technologies and
the redeployment of existing technologies to assist in pandemic management and
response).
130. See supra Section I.B (highlighting how the pandemic and other events in 2020
and 2021, such as Black Lives Matter protests and the presidential election, provide
important context for understanding shifts in privacy norms).
131. Compare Katherine Bindley, Your Health DataIsn't as Safe as You Think, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 22, 2019, 1:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-health-data-isnt-as-

safe-as-you-think-11574418606 [https://perma.cc/7F6B-C8V4] (highlighting patients'
lack of control over their data once personally identifiable information has been
removed), with Christina Farr, Hospital Execs Say They Are GettingFlooded with Requests for
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changing, even if the governing law reverts to pre-pandemic standards,
and (3) laws will set precedents for the next health crisis. Thus, privacy
laws that seek to address the harms of the pandemic must also address
the post-pandemic harms that will result.
Second, post-pandemic privacy law must reckon with systemic inequalities
and the ways in which privacy harms and risks disproportionately affect
different marginalized populations.132 The pandemic does not affect all of us
equally.133 Laws must address the disparate harms and different needs of
different populations, including women, BIPOC and LGBTQ community
members, elderly individuals, disabled people, impoverished persons,
and others who may face challenges due to systemic social issues. People
from marginalized groups disproportionately suffer from privacy harms,
including negative consequences effected by biased algorithmic systems.134
These are harms that will not disappear after the pandemic's end.
Finally, post-pandemic privacy law must be sustainable. The effects
of the pandemic on our society and our economy will last for years. 135
Policymakers must not draft legislative fixes that will hold for the next
few months, but rather must attempt to create policy that will support
the nation through the next few years and decades. They must attempt

Your Health Data, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/12/18/hospital-execs-say-theyre-flooded-with-requests-for-your-health-data.html
[https://perma.cc/GMA9-NFDR] (detailing companies' ability to identify patients
based on health data they have purchased, though the information is protected), and
Natasha Singer, When Apps Get Your MedicalData, Your PrivacyMay Go with It, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/technology/smartphonemedical-records.html [https://perma.cc/E7YX-H9PD] (identifying potential negative
consequences when patient data is more readily available without privacy restrictions).
132. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (showing that rights to data
privacy are less accessible for people of color and other minority populations).
133. See, e.g., supranotes 35-38 and accompanying text (detailing the heightened
social isolation the elderly and immunocompromised have experienced during the
pandemic).
134. Surveillance and Privacy in the Pandemic, supra note 118, at 11 ("As racialjustice
activists have noted for years, facial recognition technology is rife with bias and
accuracy issues. . . ."); see supra Section I.B (highlighting bias in algorithms, such as
ExamSoft's remote testing software).
135. Mike Patton, The Impact of Covid-19on U.S. Economy &Financial Markets, FORBES

(Oct. 12, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2020/10/12/
the-impact-of-covid-19-on-us-economy-and-financial-markets/?sh=6e7e06642d20
(explaining how COVID-19 permanently changed the labor market by hastening
corporations' shift to technological solutions in place of workers, depressing demand
for commercial real estate, and giving employers the upper hand in hiring due to high
unemployment rates).

1714

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1681

to create legal and policy solutions that will support and sustain our
privacy rights throughout this crisis and beyond.
B. Legal and Regulatory Solutions
Keeping this context in mind, and using the considerations
mentioned in my proposed framework, I recommend the following
legal and regulatory solutions to protect privacy both in this time of
pandemic and also in the post-pandemic world to come.
1.

Federalprivacy law
First, the United States must pass a federal privacy law. Now that one
party has control of both houses of Congress and even the executive,
there is potential for such a law to pass. 136 It is beyond time to create a
national framework for thinking about privacy instead of relying on a
patchwork of sectoral privacy laws that do not reflect the realities of
privacy today. 13 7 Unlike laws that focus on individual points of data
collection and individual data collectors, a federal privacy law would
offer enhanced privacy protections to Americans throughout the
entire data ecosystem. If crafted well, a federal privacy law could also
take into account discrimination and disparate impacts that privacy
violations have on different populations. A federal privacy law could
protect not just privacy, but privacy equity.
Not only is passing a federal privacy law important for creating a
sustainable solution for privacy in a pandemic and post-pandemic
world, but it is also the only way forward to protect privacy on a longterm, global scale." Short-term solutions, like proposed coronavirus
privacy bills or specific terms within coronavirus relief bills, are only
stop-gap solutions that will not last past this time. 13 Further, a federal
privacy law is the only way to make sustainable post-pandemic privacy
law in a globalized context. This legislation would not only clarify
privacy law for the nation, but it would also serve as a signal to the rest

136.

Sara M. Watson, InsiderIntelligence Predictsthat Congress Will Finally Pass a Federal

Data Privacy Law in 2021, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2020, 10:03 AM),
https: //www. businessinsider. com/congress-may-finally-pass-federal-data-privacy-lawin-2021-2020-12; see also Miller, supra note 121 (reporting that congressional
Democrats reintroduced the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act in January 2021,
which would protect health data collected during the pandemic from being used for
other purposes); infra Section IV.B.2 (discussing the same).
137. See, e.g., supra Section II.A (discussing HIPAA and how private companies that run
contact tracing applications may not fall within the Act's implementing Privacy Rule).
138. See infraSection III.B.2 (explaining that current state laws can be improved to
better protect individuals' privacy rights).
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of the world that we, along with our friends and allies in the European
Union and elsewhere, are holding privacy to be a core value for
democracy. 139 In this vein, a federal privacy law is a core component of
future, post-pandemic foreign policy.
A federal privacy law tailored towards the concerns this Article raises
is the best solution for post-pandemic privacy law. However, passing
such a law may take considerable time. In lieu of or until the passage
of a federal privacy law, we can still take steps to protect privacy in the
pandemic and in a post-pandemic world.
2.

Patchworkprivacy law updates

We can strengthen existing privacy laws. In particular, we should
examine our health, biometric, and genetic privacy laws. These
categories of data are particularly sensitive, and the pandemic has
caused a boom in collection and use of such data.140 We should expand
such laws to take into account both public and private actors, not
limited to only traditional public health institutions.141 Laws like the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act142 (BIPA) could be a good
model for creating solutions for this category of data that take into
account the entire data ecosystem, looking at collection, sharing, and
use of data, instead of simply regulating the initial collection or
transmission of data. 143 For example, BIPA includes provisions that
apply to sellers, disclosers, and buyers of biometric data.14 4 Entities can
be found to have violated BIPA through unauthorized use of biometric
data, regardless of whether the companies were the ones who initially
collected the data.1 4 5

139.

Sandra Seubert & Carlos Becker, TheDemocratic Impact of StrengtheningEuropean

Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age: The Example of Privacy Protection, 22 GERMAN L.j.,

31, 43-44 (2021) (asserting that the General Data Protection Regulation in the
European Union protects individual privacy rights and strengthens democracy).
140. See supra Section II.A.
141. See supra Section II.A (highlighting the weaknesses in HIPAA regarding entities
who are not covered by its scope but have begun to operate in the healthcare sector to
aid in COVID-19 response).
142. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1-25 (West 2008).
143. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(a)-(c).
144. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(b)-(d).
145. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(e) (making no distinction between private
entities that initially collected biometric data and private entities that simply possess
biometric data).
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Another area where we can reform privacy law is by creating a right
to educational privacy. FERPA and COPPA are not enough." Instead,
we ought to pass a new law that addresses educational privacy as a right
for both students and educators. This law should protect both the
physical space of the campus and online learning spaces. A wholesystem approach would require that an educational privacy law also be
applicable to both public education institutions as well as private
corporations, including technology companies that sell education
applications. We should value the importance of intellectual privacy in
allowing students to explore new ideas and allowing educators to share
knowledge and guide students. Of course, such a law must address
inequities in education, including the lack of access many have to
digital resources (including basic broadband internet).147
Post-pandemic privacy law must regulate data aggregators and
downstream data harms. Congress wrote many of our current privacy
laws on the basis of the outdated privacy concept of a notice-andconsent regime.1" This no longer works today, given the web of data
that surrounds each of us.149 It is no longer possible for any person to
know fully where their data goes. Data is collected, used, shared, sold,
resold, repackaged, and eventually aggregated by data brokers or data
aggregators. 15o The rise of machine learning and Al has also worsened
this privacy catastrophe, as more and more data is needed to power
these systems.151 The United States needs new laws to regulate data
146. See supranotes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing the limited scope of
privacy protections in FERPA and COPPA).
147. See supra Section L.A (discussing difficulties students have faced in the shift to
remote learning).
148. Cameron F. Kerry, Why ProtectingPrivacy Is a Losing Game Today-and How to
Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game
[https://perma.cc/3T99-8TUK] (explaining how current notice-and-consent privacy
policies are outdated); see 2020 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT'L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunicationsand-information-technology/2020-consumer-data-privacy-legislation637290470.aspx
[https://perma.cc/T7GC-ZHZV] (listing various privacy bills proposed-but not
enacted-in state legislatures during 2019 and 2020).
149. Kerry, supra note 148.
150.

FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014),

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BN2-K7U5].
151. See The World's Data Center Infrastructure Industry, 2020 Study-Aging IT
Infrastructure Unable to Store CurrentData Volume Drives Growth, CISION (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-worlds-data-center-infrastructure-
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brokers, to enforce transparency and accountability, and to limit
certain uses of data. Additionally, we must craft legal protections that
ward against downstream data harms-that is, the harms that occur
after the initial collection and use of data. These downstream harms
can include the sharing and reselling of data or the inclusion of
personal data in machine learning systems, including those that are
used in facial recognition technologies.152
Any new privacy law, or any expansion of old privacy law, must
attempt to address inequities. This is important not only because it is
the morally and ethically right thing to do, but also because our society
has increasingly valued equity over time.153 Thus, the best path forward
for creating sustainable privacy laws, and changes in privacy laws, is to
craft such laws and changes in ways that address inequities, providing
protection to all people and recognizing the unique harms and risks
that people from marginalized populations often suffer. 154 For
example, privacy laws can recognize the gender dimensions of nonconsensual intimate imagery, as the SHIELD Act, 155 does.

industry-2020-study--aging-it-infrastructure-unable-to-store-current-data-volumedrives-growth-301045175.html [https://perma.cc/8W3L-JLX9]; Wallace Immen, Big
Data Needs Big Storage, GLOBE & MAIL (June 5, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com
/business/industry-news/property-report/article-big-data-needs-big-storage-buildings
[https://perma.cc/2T7R-FCMG] (explaining how global data storage and processing
has grown drastically in recent years due to emerging technology).
152. See Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver's License PhotosAre a Gold Minefor FacialRecognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7,2019,3:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facialrecognition-searches
[https://penna.cc/DKN9-C757]
(highlighting federal law
enforcement officers' use of state Department of Motor Vehicles databases for facialrecognition surveillance); Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial
Recognition, and Where It Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020) https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/01/12/technology/facial-recognition-police.html
[https://perma.cc/A7E2-KKP6] (stating that "a 2016 study found that half of
American adults were in a law enforcement facial recognition database"); Bindley,
supra note 131 (explaining HIPAA's limitations and the potential for companies to
determine individual identities associated with health data based on other data they
already purchased or collected).
153. See supra Section II.C (suggesting that a shift in norms is underway that will
better focus society's attention on privacy equity).
154. See supra Section IA (discussing the pandemic's disparate impacts on different
sectors of the population).

155. H.R. 2896, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
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3.

Privacy law asforeign policy
Finally, due to the globalized nature of the internet and cross-border
data flows, it is important to consider not only how to protect privacy
in the United States, but also how to protect privacy on a global scale.
American policymakers should keep this broader international goal of
protecting global privacy, if for no other reason than that raising the
floor for privacy protections internationally is bound to protect the
privacy of American citizens as well. With that goal in mind,
policymakers should take measures to protect global privacy by
supporting the development of the U.S. technology industry. This may
not appear to be the obvious solution to privacy problems; however,
supporting technological development in America is a necessary part
of the U.S. policy path forward for protecting privacy in the global
context. As we have seen with many new technologies, there is a sort of
"first mover advantage" in that the companies who first create or sell a
technology often set the norms for that technology.156 The
governments that regulate those companies are often able to play a
role as well. So it was with the advent of the early internet. Much of the
early internet was shaped by researchers, developers, and companies
from the United States, which may explain why the internet developed
in a way that focused on American speech norms, instead of the more
restrictive speech and censorship norms often found in other nations.157
156. See, e.g., Patrick J. McKenna, Develop a "FirstMover" Advantage, 26 LAW PRAC.
MGMT. 41, 41-43 (2000) (explaining how professional service companies, such as law
and accounting firms, use first mover advantages to shape the norms of the industry);
Ryan Holmes, The Rules of Social MediaJust Changed. Here'sHow to Keep up, FORBES (Apr.
17, 2019, 3:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanholmes/2019/04/17/therules-of-social-media-just-changed-heres-how-to-keep-up/?sh=70bd8406731d
[https://perma.cc/99Q9-5V98] (explaining how Facebook, WeChat, and other
prominent social media platforms establish norms for other websites and
applications). But see Constantinos Markides & Lourdes Sosa, Pioneeringand FirstMover
Advantages: The Importance ofBusiness Models, 46 LONG RANGE PLAN. 325,326 (2013) (stating
that first movers in a new market rarely dominate the market, as most of them fail).
157. See Michael Aaron Dennis, Internet, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
technology/Internet (last visited May 14, 2021) (stating the internet originated in the
United States); Katrina Brooker, "I Was Devastated": Tim Berners-Lee, The Man Who
Created the World Wide Web, Has Some Regrets, VANITY FAIR (July 1, 2018),
https://www.vanityfair. com/news/2018/07/the-man-who-created-the-world-wideweb-has-some-regrets [https://perma.cc/F2UE-4564] (recounting that the inventor of
the World Wide Web, upon which the internet sits, intended for the Web to be open
and free to use); Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and
IntellectualOrigins, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REv., 10, 21-23 (2011) (detailing how American
ideals of freedom of speech spread after World War II and impacted the internet
internationally); cf. Helen Lewis, The World Is Trapped in America's Culture War, ATL.
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To support the sustainable and global development of pro-democratic
norms for privacy, the United States must continue to support the
development of the technology industry, including increasing funding for
education and research. Further, while it is necessary to create privacy
regulations and laws, the United States should not overly burden
companies, especially new startups, in a way that stymies innovation. 158
The best path forward for the United States is to support increased
American technological innovation, combined with a federal privacy
law. This is important not only to protect privacy in America, but also
to promote the cause of global democracy and privacy rights abroad.
A federal privacy law will put America on the level of our allies in
Europe and beyond, where many countries have already passed
stronger privacy laws.159 This will permit us to further establish a united
front in promoting privacy and democratic values abroad, allowing us
to support nations around the world in protecting the core values of
privacy, speech, and democracy.
IV. CURRENT LAWS AND PROPOSALS

A. Privacy Provisions in CoronavirusRelief Bills
The pandemic has caused untold suffering throughout the world,
including in the United States. The U.S. Congress has passed several
relief bills in an attempt to respond to some of the increased needs

(Oct.
27, 2020), https://www.theadantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/
internet-world-trapped-americas-culture-war/616799
[https://perma.cc/EV7F-DLAY]
(showing that American issues frequently dominate internet news sources and social
media websites in other countries). Perhaps part of the problem we can see in today's
data ecosystem can also be traced to this historical fact as well. While the United States
heavily prioritizes free speech, other nations, including many in Europe, value privacy
just as much as speech. See Anupam Chander & Uyen P. L8, Free Speech, 100 IowA L.
REv. 501, 504-07, 517-18, 541-42 (2015) (explaining that the First Amendment was
fundamental in shaping cyberlaw in America, and arguing that other countries that
lack similar protection, such as China, Iran, Russia, and South Korea, have enacted
stronger privacy laws to compensate). Perhaps if the internet had been a project of
German or French values, we would have seen, baked in from the beginning, more of
an equal valuing of privacy and speech.
158. See Tony Glosson, Note, Data Privacy in Our Federalist System: Toward an
Evaluative Frameworkfor State Privacy Laws, 67 FED. COMMNC'Ns L.J., 409, 412 (2015)
(emphasizing that having different state laws with varying levels of privacy restrictions
will impede start-ups).

159.

Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 J.O. (L 119) 1.
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from Americans. 16 These bills have mostly been broad in scope."'
Policymakers can include privacy protections in coronavirus relief bills,
though the focus of such bills has been economic relief, and not
necessarily privacy.
Four coronavirus relief bills have passed at the time of writing.162 As
the pandemic stretches onwards, it is possible that Congress will pass
further laws to provide relief to individuals and businesses suffering
from the pandemic.16 3 The U.S. government enacted the first three
coronavirus relief laws in March 2020: the Coronavirus Preparedness
and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act164 (enacted on March
6, 2020), the Families First Coronavirus Response Act165 (FFCRA)

(enacted on March 18, 2020), and the Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and

160. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9001); Coronavirus Preparedness
and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat.
146. Pub. L. 116-123 (2020); Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-

127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601); American Rescue Plan
Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2 (2021).
161. See Naomi Jagoda et al., What Is in the $900 Billion CoronavirusRelief Bill, THE
HILL (Dec. 20, 2020, 9:30 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/531086-whats-inthe-900billion-coronavirus-relief-bill [https://penna.cc/SP88-MNBW] (highlighting the
stimulus check payment provisions of one relief bill); The Treasury Department Is Delivering
COVJD-19 Relief for All Americans, DEP'T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/cares [https://perma.cc/M7FZ-LV9S] (stating that the coronavirus aid bills were
intended to "provide fast and direct economic assistance for American workers, families,
and small businesses, and preserve jobs for American industries").
162. See Erica Werner &Jeff Stein, House Vote Unlocks PartisanPathfor Biden Coronavirus
Relief Bill, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2021, 6:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-

policy/2021/02/03/house-coronavirus-relief-budget-bill

[https://perma.cc/N34E-

SSQC] (describing a vote in the House of Representatives to unlock a Senate
procedure permitting President Biden's $1.9 trillion COVID-19 aid bill to pass the
Senate with a simple majority vote); Kate Sullivan, Biden Signs Historic $1.9 Trillion
Covid-19 ReliefLaw, CNN (Mar. 11, 2021, 2:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/

03/11/politics/biden-sign-covid-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/A322-TBVG]; see
alsoJordain Carney, White House, Senate GOP Race to Finalize CoronavirusPackage Ahead of
Monday Rollout, THE HILL (July 27, 2020, 8:18 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/509108-white-house-senate-gop-race-to-finalize-coronavirus-package-ahead-ofmonday [https://perma.cc/BZ5D-5ZRS] (describing one of the COVID-19 aid
packages proposed in 2020).
163. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
164. Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act,

2020, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020).
165.

Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178

(2020) (to be codified 29 U.S.C. § 2601).
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Economic Security Act1 6 6 (CARES Act) (enacted on Marcy 27, 2020).

The CARES Act created the largest economic stimulus package in the
history of the United States,167 earmarking $2 trillion dollars in relief
funds. 168 Finally, in March 2021, the new Administration passed
another coronavirus relief law, the American Rescue Plan Act.169
These enacted COVID-19 response laws include provisions that
touch on both privacy and public health. For example, the FFCRA
includes provisions that support increased COVID-19 testing by
making testing free or low cost to individuals enrolled by covered
health plans.1 70 Perhaps most striking is the CARES Act provision that
seeks to fund a "public health surveillance and data collection system"
as part of COVID-19 response.171 While this provision is likely wellintended and acknowledges the need for more data to understand and
eventually end this pandemic, there are significant privacy concerns
that come with any expansion of government surveillance. 7 2
All existing coronavirus relief laws lack concrete privacy protections
for data collected as part of any public health surveillance apparatus,
though the CARES Act does mandate oversight from the Pandemic
Response Accountability Committee (PRAC).173 However, some have
questioned PRAC's ability to oversee data collection, particularly as
President Trump fired PRAC's presumptive chair shortly after
Congress passed the bill.174

166.

Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No.

116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9001).
167. Sarah D. Wire, Senate Passes $2-Trillion Economic Stimulus Package, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2020, 8:57 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-03-25/votesenate-on-2-trillion-economic-s imulus-package-coronavirus.
168. See, e.g., Barbara Sprunt, READ: $2 Trillion CoronavirusReliefBill, NPR (Mar. 25,

2020,

10:29

PM),

https://www.npr.org/2020/03/25/820759545/read-2-trillion-

coronavirus-relief-bill [https://penna.cc/Z9A9-J6UK].
169. See Sullivan, supranote 162.
170. Families First Coronavirus Response Act §§ 6001-6002.
171. § 6002 134 Stat. at 281, 554; see also Sidney Fussell, The Coronavirus Relief Bill
Promotes Surveillance for Health, WIRED
(Mar.
31,
2020,
12:26
PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-relief-bill-promotes-surveillance-health
[https://perma.cc/82M2-PEQN].
172. See generally Introduction to Public Health Surveillance, CDC (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/training/publichealth1lo/surveillance.html
[https://penna.cc/UV6FW9XH] (providing an introduction to public health surveillance).

173. § 6002 134 Stat. at 533-34.
174. E.g., Niels Lesniewski, SenateDemocratsBack Oversight Efforts After Trump Removal
of IG, ROLL CALL (Apr. 8, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/04/08
/senate-democrats-back-oversight-efforts-after-trump-removal-of-ig
[https://perma.cc/PXZ4-ZA3A] (providing statements from Senators Elizabeth
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If the pandemic continues and Congress finds the political will to
pass additional relief bills tagged to the coronavirus pandemic, there
could be opportunity to include privacy protections, with the
understanding that there would be considerable difficulty in getting
policymaker buy-in to add anything that might jeopardize other
interests in an already fraught political environment. To be fair, these
challenges would likely exist for other legislative proposals to protect
privacy, including the creation of a federal privacy law.
In the absence of more long-term privacy measures, like a federal
privacy law or a politically viable federal law specifically aimed at
privacy and the coronavirus, privacy advocates can press for privacy
measures in other laws, including relief bills aimed at getting
Americans through challenging times. Policymakers should consider
privacy protections that are: (1) helpful for protecting privacy; (2)
minimally intrusive (as in, having a minimal impact on material
provisions of the bill); and (3) least likely to attract controversy that
could derail the passing of such proposals. An ideal privacy provision
would unobtrusively fold in some minor privacy protections While it
may seem counterintuitive to call for less obtrusive, comparatively
minor privacy protections, it is more likely that additions of this kind
would be able to pass through the legislative process. At the very least,
policymakers should consider privacy impacts when drafting terms that
apply to new technologies as well as data collection and use involving
contact tracing or other forms of medical surveillance.
There are two policy recommendations that policymakers could fold
into relief packages in this manner: (1) data transparency and
auditability; and (2) data purpose limitation. Adding in mention of the
need (or the preference) for data collectors to be transparent about
their data practices would be useful, as would a mention that such data
transparency could be useful for future audits by regulators (and for
public knowledge).175 Transparency can help bring misuse of data to
light, and it can help provide evidence that can foster greater
understanding of privacy practices, which in turn can aid in the
development of future regulations. Second, purpose limitation would

Warren and Richard Blumenthal describing President Trump's decision to fire the
chair as a "clear effort" to "prevent oversight and avoid accountability").
175. See, e.g., Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designingfor Transparency and
Trust, HARv. Bus. REv. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-datadesigning-for-transparency-and-trust?registration=success
[https://perma.cc/8SUUV299] (suggesting that data use transparency reinforces trust, which increases the
likelihood that consumers share their data).
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be helpful to include in any section dealing with COVID-19 testing or
other forms of data collection. 17 , Privacy protections can be added into
sections dealing with education and employment as well as in sections
dedicated to health responses. While policymakers can incorporate
privacy protections in general COVID-19 relief bills, Congress also can
and should pass separate privacy-centered legislation.
B. CoronavirusPrivacy Bills

At time of writing, the 116th and 117th Congresses have collectively
evaluated two competing bills dedicated solely or primarily to
protecting privacy as part of COVID-19 response. Senate Republicans
in the 116th Congress introduced the COVID-19 Consumer Data
Protection Act of 2020177 (CCDPA), while Democrats in both houses of
Congress have introduced the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act178
(PHEPA). Both bills address privacy protections for the data collection
and tracking measures used in public health response during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and both have some similar provisions. 179
Regardless of whether Congress passes any bill on coronavirus and
privacy before the end of the pandemic, it is likely that future
legislatures will refer to these past bills in future times of public health
crisis. Thus, it is helpful to analyze these bills now to begin to establish a
scholarly and public understanding of what must be done for the future.
1.

The COVID-19 ConsumerDataProtection Act of 2020
On April 30, 2020, Republican Senators Roger Wicker (MS), John
Thune (SD), Jerry Moran (KS), and Marsha Blackburn (TN)
announced a new bill specifically targeting COVID-19 and privacy.180

176.

See Cathy Cosgrove, Privacy Questions for COVD-19 Testing and Health Monitoring,

IAPP (May 13, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-questions-for-covid-9-testing-

and-health-monitoring [https://perma.cc/9T2U-MELG] (identifying various examples
of the widespread sharing of personal data and test results, such as first responders'
access to addresses of people who tested positive for COVID-19).

177. COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020).
178. Public Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA), S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020).
179. Compare S. 3663 § 3(a) (outlining privacy measures to protect data collection
and tracking), with S. 3749 § 3 (same).
180. COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong.
(2020); see also Senate Republicans Unveil COVD-19-Specific PrivacyBill, PRIv. & INFO. SEC.
L. BLOG (May 1, 2020), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2020/05/01/senaterepublicans-unveil-covid-19-specific-privacy-bill [https://penna.cc/4R5Y-EACZ]; CynthiaJ.
Larose, COVID-19PrivacyProposalson Both Sides of the Aisle: A Comparison, NAT'L L. REv., May

28, 2020.
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CCDPA included a standard notice-and-consent framework,181 along
with the following requirements: purpose limitation, in which
organizations can only collect and use data for specific purposes; 18 2
data minimization, requiring the collection of as little data as possible
to achieve purposes of that data; 18 opt-out rights for individuals,
allowing them to revoke consent and triggering an obligation for data
holders to delete data; 184 security measures; 185 and transparency, or an
affirmative obligation for data holders to have privacy notices and publish
transparency reports.186 The bill would have limited these privacy
requirements to only the period of the public health emergency. 187
While the 116th Congress did not act further on the bill, and the
current Congress has not reintroduced this bill, there are a few
interesting items to note. First, the bill incorrectly defined "aggregated
data" as "information that-(A) relates to a group or category of
individuals; and (B) does not identify, and is not linked or reasonably
linkable to, any individual."188 This definition appears to conflate
aggregated data and de-identified data, a separate term that later
appears in the bill. 189 This misunderstanding, if perpetuated, is
concerning not only because it could lead to some confusion in
interpretation, but also because it reflects a lack of understanding of
key privacy concepts or a conflict between technical voices in drafting.
Next, the bill does do something quite interesting, possibly even
radical, in protecting a new category of "proximity data," defined as
"technologically derived information that identifies the past or present
proximity of one individual to another.""4 Proximity data is not a
traditionally protected category of data in U.S. privacy jurisprudence
or in the privacy legal regimes of most nations.191 However, proximity
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

S. 3663 § 3(a) (1)-(2).
Id. § 3(a) (3), (b).
Id. § 3(g).
Id. § 3(d).
Id. § 3(h).
Id. § 3(c).
Id. § 2(8).
Id. § 2(1) (A)-(B).
Id. § 2(9).
Id. § 2(17).

191. Cf. supranotes 110-13 and accompanying text (noting the limited data privacy
protections in COPPA and FERPA, both of which lacked protections for proximity
data); Todd Ehret, Data Privacy Laws Collide with Contact Tracing Efforts; Privacy Is

Prevailing, REUTERS (July 21, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/bcfinreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/data-privacy-laws-collide-with-contact-tracingefforts-privacy-is-prevailing-idUSKCN24M1NL (characterizing U.S. privacy law as a
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data has come to the forefront with the rise of contact tracing as a key
pandemic response.192 Protecting proximity data as separate from
location data creates unique repercussions for privacy law in the
United States and perhaps abroad. While most privacy concerns have
focused on privacy for individuals, proximity data brings the concept
of group privacy to the stage. 193
The bill also has a "publicly available information" exception that
includes "video, internet, or audio content."" This exception echoes
similar publicly available information exceptions in the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008195 (GINA), as well as other
privacy laws.196 This is interesting because Clearview Al and Palantir
proposed COVID-19 responses consisting of facial recognition systems
that rely on this exact kind of publicly scrapeable content.1 9 7
Lawmakers face an uphill battle in regulating facial recognition, as
current laws and regulations do not protect individuals (or groups)
from the harms of facial recognition, in times of pandemic or
otherwise. 198 Further, not only does the law not adequately address
facial recognition as a form of technology and a manner of

"legal minefield" and a "complex patchwork of regulations" due to the lack of an
"overarching federal data privacy regulation").
192. Supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text; see supra note 124 and
accompanying text (describing Google and Apple's joint contact tracing application).
193. See generally Group Privacy in the Age of Big Data, DATA-POP ALL.,
https://datapopalliance.org/item/group-privacy-in-the-age-of-big-data
[https://perma.cc/8JLE-P7B8] (providing a brief explanation of the rise of group data).

194. S. 3663 § 2(6) (B), (17) (B) (ii).
195. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff).
196. See S. 3663 §2(6)(B) (providing an exception for publicly available
information); see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b) (4)
(same); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 § 9 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(o) (2) (West 2021)) (same); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.02 (2021) (same).
197. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/6W48-F662] (explaining
how Clearview Al, a facial recognition application, gathers publicly available photos of
people that are posted to "Facebook, YouTube, Venmo and millions of other
websites"); Kirsten Grind et al., To Track Virus, Governments Weigh Surveillance Tools that
Push Privacy Limits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2020, 7:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/to-track-virus-governments-weigh-surveillance-tools-that-push-privacy-limits-

11584479841 [https://perma.cc/V8H-76U9] (describing Palantir's relationship with
the CDC to perform data collection and integration tasks).
198. See Contract Tracing and Other Innovative TechnologicalResponses, supranote 5, at
10 (explaining that "members of Congress expressed rare bipartisan opposition to
facial recognition technology, citing accuracy issues and potential encroachment on
constitutionally protected civil liberties").
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surveillance, but the law also does not solve for the privacy harms
related to publicly available data (either data that was made public
intentionally or through unauthorized means).
The bill includes an explicit preemption clause,200 which may prove
to be politically untenable, as many states have privacy laws that would
conflict with what the bill's sponsors proposed. 2 1 Of particular
importance to privacy advocates may be the risk that a weaker federal
privacy law could preempt provisions in stronger state privacy laws, like
the California Consumer Protection Act 20 2 or the Illinois Biometric

Information Privacy Act. Ideally, a federal privacy law would be able to
incorporate many of the stronger provisions from state laws. In
general, by recognizing the gaps in current privacy legislation that
exist, this bill adds to the growing movement toward the United States
creating and eventually passing legislation that amounts to a federal
privacy law.
2. The Public Health Emergency Privacy Act
On May 14, 2020, a group of House and Senate Democrats
introduced a new bill, the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act,
seeking to target contact tracing and other privacy issues related to
pandemic response. 203 This bill, like the Republican bill, did not come

199. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REv. 459, 462
(2019) ("Tort law, statutes, and interpretations of constitutional amendments
regularly deploy the concept of 'public information' to justify surveillance or data
practices."); see also HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir.
2019) (affirming the district court's decision that "the public interest favors hiQ's position"
that data scraping helps "maximiz [e] the free flow of information on the Internet").
200. COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong.

§ 4(b)(3) (2020).
201.

SeeAdam Schwartz, Two FederalCOVID-19PrivacyBills: A Good Start and a Misstep,

EFF (May 28, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/two-federal-covid-19privacy-bills-good-start-and-misstep [https://perma.cc/2HW3-4DVB] (noting that the
CCDPA would reduce Californians' rights to "access, delete, or opt-out of the sale of
data collected for COVID purposes" and strip Illinoisans' legal right "to be free from
unconsented biometric surveillance for COVID purposes"); see also Kiran K.Jeevanjee,
Comment, Nice Thought, Poor Execution: Why the Dormant Commerce Clause Precludes
California'sCCPA from Setting NationalPrivacy Law, 70 AM. U. L. REv. F. 75, 129 (2020)
(contending that the absence of national privacy legislation will spur states to create
their own privacy rules, which will ultimately become "unworkable and costly").
202. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o) (2) (West 2021).
203. Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020); see also
Margaret Harding McGill, Democrats Offer Public Health Privacy Legislation, Amos (May 14,
2020), https://www.axios.com/democrats-privacy-coronavirus-contact-tracing-b495dc29-

66cc-4b89-9839-4a171bd48ce3.html

[https://perma.cc/92BJ-LQ3H]

(characterizing
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to pass in 2020. However, after determination of the final results of the
2020 election, including the special run-off election for two Georgia
senate seats, Democrats now have a slim majority in both houses of
Congress. 2 4 Democrats in both houses reintroduced PHEPA in
January 2021, after Congress certified the results of the election. 2 5 At
time of writing, it remains to be seen whether the bill will pass, and, if
so, in what form. However, because Democrats have control over both
houses of Congress and the executive, it is possible that some form of
PHEPA will pass.
Similar to CCDPA, PHEPA includes some standard privacy
protections, including purpose limitations and reasonable security
measures. 20 6 Both bills utilize a basic informed-consent standard for
allowing the collection, use, and disclosure of data. 20 7 Both bills include
transparency reporting of sorts as a requirement for covered entities. 208
One key difference between the bills is that CCDPA only includes
private entities under its terms, but PHEPA covers public entities as
well. 20 9 PHEPA also has an explicit non-preemption clause.2 0
PHEPA differs from CCDPA in its focus on protecting against
discrimination harms. PHEPA includes "reasonable safeguards to
prevent unlawful discrimination on the basis of emergency health
data" and limitations on disclosure of data to government entities. 211
Perhaps with an eye toward election disturbance and voter rights
suppression, this bill also includes a provision prohibiting government
entities from denying, restricting, or interfering with the right to vote
PHEPA as a legislative tool designed to enhance trust in the use of technology to obtain

data in the fight against COVID-19).
204. Patricia Zengerle & Susan Cornwell, Democrats Take Narrow Control of U.S. Senate,
REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2021, 4:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usacongress/democrats-take-narrow-control-of-u-s-senate-idUSKBN29P2SD
[https://perma.cc/9MKF-RZZV] (stating that "for the first time in a decade,"
Democrats have control of both houses of Congress).
205. Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 81, 117th Cong. (2021); Public Health
Emergency Privacy Act, H.R. 651, 117th Cong. (2021); Miller, supra note 121.
206. S. 81 § 3 (a)-(b); see alsosupranotes 181-86 and accompanying text (explaining
that the Consumer Data Privacy Protection Act of 2020, Senate Republicans' data
privacy bill, also includes purpose limitations and security measures).
207. S. 81 § 3(d); supra note 181 and corresponding text.
208. S. 81 § 3(f); supra note 186 and corresponding text.
209. Compare S. 81 § 2(4)(A) (defining a "Covered Organization" to encompass
government entities), with COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663,
116th Cong. § 2(7) (A)-(C) (defining a "Covered Entity" without explicit reference to
government entities).

210. S. 81 § 7.
211. Id. § 3(a) (3).
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based on an individual's "emergency health data, medical condition,
or participation or non-participation in a program to collect
emergency health data." 21 2

Of note, PHEPA specifically excludes manual contact tracing and
states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to limit or prohibit
a public health authority from administering programs or activities to
identify individuals who have contracted, or may have been exposed
to, COVID-19" through traditional means of human contact tracing. 213
PHEPA also includes an exception for public health or scientific
research related to the pandemic (by certain entities). 214
Finally, PHEPA includes a data-deletion provision that requires that
data be "destroyed or rendered not linkable in such a manner that is
impossible or demonstrably impracticable to identify any individual
from the data" after a statutorily defined date. 215
Given the unified Democratic control of government in Washington,
hope for a federal privacy law seems realistic. 216 However, it is still
unclear what will be in that law, whom the law will protect, and how the
new law might change our society's relationship with technology.
CONCLUSION

It is not too late to prevent some of the long-lasting harms of privacy
violations incurred during this pandemic. To protect privacy in a time
of pandemic, we must understand the impact the pandemic has had
on society, in context of the larger historical setting of our time.
Additionally, we must recognize the ways in which the pandemic has
already changed our norms for privacy through novel or increased uses
of technology and public health responses involving data and privacy.
By addressing these concerns, we can better create laws and other
changes to protect privacy in times of public health crisis and chart a
path forward for privacy law in this pandemic and after.

212.

Id. § 4(a).

213.

Id. § 3(h) (2) (i).

214.

Id. § 3(j).

215.
216.

Id. § 3 (g) (1)-(2).
SeeJennifer Bryant, 2021 Best Chance'forUS PrivacyLegislation,IAPP (Dec. 7, 2020),

https://iapp.org/news/a/2021-best-chance-for-federal-privacy-legislation
[https://perma.cc/P8TV-ZXRD] (recounting the view of Peter Swire, President
Clinton's chief counselor for privacy, that the 117th Congress presents "the best
chance for comprehensive federal legislation" that he has ever seen).

